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This thesis consists of three papers on different topics on the sequential learning
problem. The first paper is a stochastic game model of predator-prey interaction that
combines search and pursuit in a single game. In this paper I introduce a novel learning
model in which certain parameters of the model could in theory be learned sequentially
over time. The second paper in this thesis focuses on the deterministic version of the
similar search and pursuit problem. By relaxing the assumption made since Gal and
Casas [36], I introduce three sub-problems to the original model and provide general
propositions to each of them. The third paper departs from the area of search games and
analyzes the optimal voting ordering in sequential juries. Together with Steve Alpern,
Bo Chen, and Chenxin Pan, we studied a new version of the Alpern–Chen model [2].
Our paper makes the notion of “ability” more specific by introducing the sealed card
model in which the state of Nature (equivalent to innocent or guilty for a legal jury) is
the color of a sealed card and the jurors sample other cards in the deck as their ‘signals’
and they vote sequentially. I show that under this model, by voting in Alpern-Chen
ordering (median ability, high ability, low ability), the jury ensures the highest average




This thesis follows the Warwick Business School structure as a three-paper thesis. It is
based on three journal articles, where two of them are already published and the third
one is in preparation for submission. The three articles have a common theme where
sequential learning is used to predict some unknown state of Nature. In the first two
articles, the state of Nature could be the hiding location of a prey animal; in the third
article, it could be for instance, the innocence or guilt of a defendant to be decided by
a jury.
The thesis explores different aspects of sequential learning problems. The three
main chapters, though distinct in their focus, are aimed at analyzing the role of sequential
learning in two areas: Search and Pursuit Games, and Jury Voting Problem. Chapter 2
studies the search and pursuit interaction between a predator and a prey using stochas-
tic games, while Chapter 3 solves similar problem to that above, using the normal form
game. Chapter 4 is within the realm of a Jury Voting Problem. More specifically, this
is a discrete model, expressed in an easy-to-understand setting of playing cards, which
simplifies the seminal model of Alpern and Chen [2], on sequential juries. Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 are within the framework of non–cooperative zero–sum game, specifically
search games, while the main research question in chapter 4 is an optimization prob-
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lem solved using integer and dynamic programming. The common thread of the three
chapters is to learn the state of Nature (hiding locations or correct alternative) through
sequential tests, which could be searching or sampling.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2, 3, and 4 are presented in the form
of papers. The first two are published and the third paper is ready for submission. Thus,
each chapter consists of its own introduction, literature review, methodology, findings,
and conclusion. Chapter 2 corresponds to a published paper in [12]. Chapter 3 is drawn
from [14] which has been published in the most recent edition of Advances in Dynamic
Games. Chapter 4 is an unpublished paper written with Steve Alpern, Bo Chen, and
Chenxin Pan. This paper is in its final draft and is in preparation for submission
[5]. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and describes future
research directions. The rest of this Section summarizes each paper, giving the reader
the main idea and the contributions to the literature. Section 1.4 in particular discusses
the role of Operations Research in search and pursuit games and jury voting problem.
1.1 A Stochastic Game Model of Searching Predator and
Hiding Prey (Chapter 2)
When the spatial density of both prey and predators is very low, the problem they face
may be modelled as a two-person game (called a ‘search game’) between one member of
each type. Following recent models of search and pursuit, we assume the prey has a fixed
number of heterogeneous ‘hiding’ places (for example, ice holes for a seal to breathe) and
that the predator (maybe polar bear) has the time or energy to search a fixed number
of these. If he searches the actual hiding location and also successfully pursues the prey
there, he wins the game. If he fails to find the prey, he loses. In this chapter, we modify
the outcome in the case that he finds but does not catch the prey. The prey is now
vulnerable to capture while relocating with risk depending on the intervening terrain.
This generalizes the original games to a stochastic game framework, a first for search and
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pursuit games. We outline a general solution and also compute particular solutions. This
modified model now has implications for the question of when to stay or leave the lair
and by what routes. In particular, we find the counterintuitive result that in some cases
adding risk of predation during prey relocation may result in more relocation. We also
model the process by which the players can learn about the properties of the different
hiding locations and find that having to learn the capture probabilities is favourable to
the prey.
1.2 A Normal Form Game Model of Search and Pursuit
(Chapter 3)
There is an extensive literature on search games where the prey chooses to hide at one
of a finite number of locations (for example cells, boxes, etc.) and then the predator
looks sequentially into these potential hiding locations to try to find the prey. These
locations might be heterogeneous in the cost of searching and in the probability that a
hider may escape after his location is searched. This is a simple but useful model that
encompasses both the search and the pursuit portions of the predator-prey interaction.
The literature on this model has been discussed in [36] with a strict assumption that all
locations have the same cost to search. We relax this assumption so that each location
takes a certain time to inspect and the predator has total inspection time k. We also
consider a repeated game model where the capture probabilities only become known to
the players over time, as each successful escape from a location lowers its perceived value
capture probability.
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1.3 Optimizing Voting Order on Sequential Juries: A Sealed
Card Model (Chapter 4)
The celebrated Jury Theorem of [29] considered an odd size jury in which jurors vote
simultaneously after receiving independent signals, correct with the same probability
p > 1/2, concerning which of two binary possibilities (maybe innocent or guilty) is true.
The reliability of the majority verdict, the probability it is correct, goes to 1 as the
jury size tends to infinity. Recently, [2] considered a variation of the Condorcet model
in which jurors vote sequentially (rather than simultaneously), with knowledge of prior
voting. In addition, jurors are heterogeneous in a quality called ability, which affects the
usefulness of their signals for predicting the true possibility. Their notion of ability was
abstract, modelling for example eyesight quality for jurors making line calls in tennis.
For a jury of size three of given distinct abilities, they found that reliability was order
dependent and maximized when jurors vote as follows: first the juror of median ability,
then of high ability, then of low ability.
This paper makes the notion of ability concrete, with a different signal distribu-
tion than Alpern-Chen. A (sealed) card is removed from a deck of m red and m black
cards. Each juror draws a number of cards equal to his integer-valued ability and votes
for the color of the sealed card, based on his draw and prior voting. We find that the
Alpern-Chen (median-high-low) ordering has the highest reliability in most cases, and
it generally is also better than simultaneous voting. In the cases where the latter is
better, the abilities of the jurors tend to be similar. An analogue of this ordering has
high reliability for larger juries.
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1.4 The Role of Operations Research in Search - Pursuit
Games and Jury Voting Problems
The subject of my thesis falls within the realm of Operations Research. In Search and
Pursuit games, the objective of our studies is to compute the optimal search and hiding
policy of a searcher and a hider. In Jury voting problem, our study focuses on using
integer programming to calculate the probability of three or five jurors obtaining the
final verdict which is equal to the true state of Nature. Given the heterogeneity of the
jurors (each juror has different ability), our analysis aims to identify the optimal voting
order: the one which gives the highest probability of reaching the final verdict equal to
the true state of Nature.
Almost all of the literature published to date on search and pursuit games are
known to have originated from the field of Search Theory [41]. The area of search theory
itself is a research field within operations research which arose from research studies into
air defense operations in England during World War II. The earliest conception of search
theory traces back to the many problems faced by the U.S Navy in an Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) against the German’s U-boats during the same war. In 1944, John Von
Neumann developed the Search Games to put the findings in search theory into practices.
Here it should be noted that while Operations Research and Search Games became
popular around the world after WWII, the merging of the two areas has been recorded
since 1951 in a well-known book by Morse and Kimball called Methods of Operations
Research [56], which is one of the most famous Operations Research textbooks.
From the history mentioned above, it can be deduced that search game focuses
on realistic problems faced by a searcher attempting to locate hider(s). The game can be
defined as the study of finding an optimal ways to search for hiders in the search activity
that involves searcher(s) and hider(s). Thus, one can think of search problems faced by
a searcher (or symmetrically, a hider) that looks for optimal solutions in optimization
problems as examples of search games.
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In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we consider the application of search and pursuit
games, using methods from stochastic games, deterministic games, as well as Markov
Decision Process (MDP) to understand the behaviour of a searching predator and a
hiding prey in ecological search activities. In Chapter 3 Section 3.3, we also provide a
simple analysis of how the best-response problem encountered by the searcher could be
viewed as a classic operations research problem, called the Knapsack problem.
It is not difficult to imagine our findings to be applied to many scenarios. For
instance, a search and pursuit activity between a law enforcement officer and a criminal
in a specific region or district. a criminal may choose to hide in a small neighborhood
where the time to search is small but the probability of running away is larger due to
many shortcuts and elusive nooks. Larger neighborhood on the other hand may have
larger search time but higher capture probability due to the many open spaces. The
problem for the searcher is to optimally distribute his search allocation to maximize the
probability of finding and capturing the criminal.
In Chapter 4, we study the optimal ordering of an odd-sized jury in an open
sequential vote using applications from probability techniques (similar to that of the urn
sampling model), information aggregation between voters through Bayesian analysis,
and optimization into group decision-making process. To illustrate how our study falls
within the remit of business school particularly area of operations research, consider
a scenario as follows: A firm or an organization has to make an important decision.
The best decision depends on whether Nature is in one of two possible states: A or B.
To determine which is the actual state, as well as possible, the organization assemble
a jury of experts. For instance, if the decision is whether to put someone into jail, it
convenes a legal jury to decide whether the defendant is guilty (A) or innocent (B).
More often within the nature of its application, the jury may consist of economists who
aim to determine the future state of the economy in order to decide whether to make an
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investment. In all these cases, the experts (jurors) will normally have different abilities
(or expertise, judgement, economic knowledge) to determine the actual state of Nature.
It is often assumed from previous works ([29], [23]) that the order in which the juror votes
does not matter, given each voter can assume he is making the pivotal vote. However,
when we introduce a parameter such as ability for each voter and they vote sequentially,
the voting order assuredly does matter. In a three-member jury for instance, if all the
three jurors have different ability, where do we put the higher–ability juror(s) in terms
of voting ordering? Surely we do not want them to vote last because if the first two
jurors agreed, the final verdict had been reached. If we put the highest-ability to vote
first, the lower ability might disregard their own judgement and simply follow the vote
of the higher–ability juror. This is called herding. This observation is the starting point
of our analysis of how there exist a unique optimal voting ordering for heterogeneous
jury who votes sequentially for binary alternatives.
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Chapter 2
A Stochastic Game Model of
Searching Predator and Hiding
Prey
2.1 Introduction
Foraging theory is generally concerned with groups of predators and prey and consider-
ations of spatial densities are important. However when both predator and prey density
is very small, it may be a good approximation to assume that the local environment
contains one predator and one prey (or none, in which case the predator is doomed any-
way). In this case a two person zero sum win-lose game model may be useful, where the
predator wins the local game if it finds and successfully pursues the prey and otherwise
the prey wins. Such a model, with both search and pursuit considered, was introduced
in [36]. In this and the following models, the prey could hide among a fixed number n of
‘locations’ (hiding places), and the predator had enough time or energy to look into only
k of them in any period. The locations i are heterogeneous in the probability pi that
the predator successfully pursues a prey found at location i. This model was extended
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to multiple periods in [11] in the case that the prey is found but not caught, in which
case it can relocate at any hiding place in the next period. The relocation process was
assumed to be riskless for the prey. In this paper that unrealistic assumption has been
relaxed in that the prey is assumed to be captured by the predator when relocating from
location i to location j with known probabilities αi,j , representing the danger of such a
relocation in terms of the terrain that needs to be crossed. This paper also introduces a
model where the capture probabilities pi are not know initially by the players, but are
learned over time. Thus while, we model precisely the hide-seek part of the game, the
pursuit part is simplified by the adoption of known values of the pi. That part of the
game might also be modeled, as in [34]. To make the relationship of the published and
new models clearer, Table 2.1 compares their various properties.
One Period Repeated Learning Stochastic
symbol for game Gk L ∆k
publication reference, section [36], 2.4.1 [11], 2.4.2 2.8 2.5, 2.6, 2.7
number of periods 1 ∞ 2,3 ∞
searches within a period k k 1 k
capture between periods? - no no yes
state dependent transitions? - no no yes
discounting? - yes,no no yes,no
probabilities pi known? yes yes no yes
Table 2.1: Comparison and Progression of the Hide-Seek-Pursuit Models
A final caution is that our notion of prey animals ‘hiding’ should not be taken
too literally or restrictively. In fact the prey are usually carrying out some other activity,
like seals choosing an ice hole for breathing [70], which they wish to do repeatedly in an
unpredictable manner to avoid its predator, the polar bear. It could be choosing a water
hole, as in [73]. We use the metaphor of hiding to put this problem into the hide-seek
literature, which we already extended to hide-seek-pursuit. From the point of view of
the predator, the location of the prey is ‘hidden’, not known in advance of the search
procedure.
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2.1.1 Qualitative summary of main results
The main results of this paper are mathematical theorems distributed throughout Sec-
tions 2.5 to 2.8. Most of these are quantitative in nature, for example we give precise
optimal probabilities for the prey to hide at each location, possibly based on its prior
location. However we believe it is useful to give rough qualitative versions of some of
these results here. For the precise results on which these summaries are based, refer to
the specific results quoted.
1. In a two location model analyzed in Section 2.7, there is only a risk of inter-period
capture if the prey moves to the other location (relocates) rather than remaining
at its original location. We find the counter-intuitive result that increasing the risk
of relocation (higher capture probability during the move) may also increase the
frequency of relocation by the prey under its optimal hiding strategy.
2. For certain data on the pi, if the prey hides optimally in terms of the predator
strategy, rather than simply hiding randomly, it can reduce the probability of
eventually capture from about 0.46 to about 0.29. This is a reduction of about
37%. See equation (2.31)
3. When there is learning, higher variability of locations with respect to their capture
probabilities favors the predator if these probabilities are high; but favors the prey
if these probabilities are low. (Proposition 2)
4. When the patch is disrupted by some event (hurricane, drought) which may change
the pursuit characteristics of the different locations, the fact that their capture
probabilities must be learned again is favorable to the prey. (Proposition 1)
2.2 The Search Game Literature
The field of search games is an area of two person zero-sum games where the Hider and
Searcher are in a known search region and choose their motions: the Hider (mobile or
10
immobile) wishes to avoid or delay capture. In the search games most relevant to our
model, the Hider chooses to locate at one of a finite number of locations (called cells,
boxes, etc.) and then the Searcher looks sequentially into these boxes to try to find the
Hider. These boxes may be heterogeneous in the overlook probability (that the Searcher
looks into the correct location but does not see the Hider) and the cost of searching.
The literature on this aspect of our model when the Searcher has a limited amount of
time to find the Hider has been discussed in [36]. A related paper is the study of [49],
who find a search strategy independent of the limited time horizon. The repetition of
search in repeated periods is modeled in [7] and [8], where during the search the prey
(Hider) may attempt to flee the search region. The prey will succeed in this attempt if
the predator is in a cruise search mode, but not if he is in an ambush mode. In those
models, a successful flight by the prey is definitely followed by a renewed attempt by
the predator to find it. Search games with a network structure (related to transitions
in our model) are studied in [18] and [15]. To extend our work to multiple hidden prey,
the abstract model of [47] would be useful.
The problem of where to hide food (in discrete packages such as nuts) rather
than where to hide oneself, has been analyzed in a search game played between a scatter
hoarder such as a squirrel and a pilferer in [6]. The squirrel has limited digging energy
and has to decide between placing nuts deeply hidden in one place or alternatively widely
scattered at shallower depths. This problem is somewhat analogous to the problem of
a prey hiding in a good location or randomly choosing among less good locations. Of
course the payoffs are of a different kind as the prey either gets caught or not; while
the squirrel either has enough nuts left to survive the winter, or not. Also, there is no
pursuit phase in the squirrel’s problem.
The work of [73] and [74] included ambush modes for the searching predator. A
‘silent predator’ (whose approach is not observable by the prey) was considered in [16].
More biologically realistic models were considered by [25] and [60]. The wider subject
11
of search games is the subject of the monograph [9].
2.3 Behavioral Ecology Literature
The study of predator optimal foraging for stationary prey has a long history since
the 60s ( [69], [68]). Simple situations can be formalized using graphic methods, as for
the patch leaving rule, while complex situations, as foraging in a stochastic environment,
require elaborate formalism such as stochastic dynamic programming [50]. These studies
show that predators follow optimal solutions, but also use simpler rules of thumb. The
study of optimal escape of prey is more recent [30]. Indeed, the advent of new tracking
devices, from accelerometers to UAVs, enabled the collection of massive precision data
about predator and prey movements only recently (see for example [72], [24]) and the
recording of the paths of both antagonists even more recently, see [27]. The field is
thus currently experiencing an explosion in terms of observation and experiments, while
the modeling formalism is lagging behind. Here again, several key aspects have been
formalized using graphical arguments. The number of models addressing more realistic
situations is however much lower. In all these approaches, the consideration is focusing
on a single agent, the predator or the prey, acting in a possibly changing environment.
This is the heart of optimal foraging theory.
Cases in which antagonists have no or incomplete information during the interac-
tion have been rarely studied, both phenomenological and in terms of optimal behavior.
This is surprising given their frequent occurrence in Nature. Biological examples fitting
such description include polar bears hunting for seals at breathing holes, parasitic wasps
hunting host larvae hidden inside leaves or wolves hunting elk in deep forests. While
the first two examples have been described in detail earlier in this context ([36],[11]),
the interaction between wolves and their prey was not, and is thus summarized here.
The authors of [53] have patiently collated numerous observations of wolf packs pursuing
many species of prey. Elk in particular (p. 68) seem to use features of the landscape to
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escape. They prefer areas where dead trees have toppled, creating an entanglement of
logs difficult to travel through. Mountain sheep, another prey, are also unique in their
agility, sure-footedness and maneuverability over rugged terrain. The hide and seek
games reported in that book are great examples of search games, including the added
complexity displayed by wolves, sometimes able to predict the escape route of their prey
and to position themselves accordingly. As exemplified by these case studies, Nature
seems replete with predator-prey interactions which are best viewed as search games.
While repeated search games [11] represent the most realistic types of interactions mod-
eled so far, they still lack essential ingredients of interactions between foraging predators
and escaping prey. We focus here on two such wanting elements, the spatial distribution
of risk between and among hiding sites and the change of the environment during the
interaction.
The spatial distribution of the risk of predation among and between discrete
hiding locations can be categorized into two extreme cases. In the first case, the locations
are relatively safe places. Examples include retreat holes for mammals, hiding crevices
for lizards, bushes for small passerine birds or feeding tubes for worms in the sea [30]
Here, the most dangerous moments are when animals are away or out of these positions,
or when they move to them. By contrast, once the retreat is reached, the probability
of being caught is decreased to a large degree, at times null. In the second case, the
locations represent zones of high attack probabilities, while moving between them is risk-
less. Breathing holes of seals attacked by polar bears or feeding windows of caterpillars
attached by wasps are of this type ([36],[11]). Indeed, polar bears cannot attack seals
while their travel below the ice sheet and wasps cannot attack leafminer larvae if they rest
under the intact thick cuticula of a leaf. There is of course a continuum of cases spanning
the two extremes. Thus, the most general model should allow capture both on site and
while moving from site to site. The capture probability might be furthermore depending
on the predator strategy, for example when predators choose which of the sites to visit,
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but might also be independent of the predator. The amount of vegetation cover, or the
difficulty of progressing on the terrain between two sites are two such possible influencing
factors. In these cases, there still exist site-to-site path dependent capture probabilities.
We thus conclude that a realistic model should make the distinction between these risks
among sites and between sites. In previous work, we dealt so far only with among site
variability in predation risk. The present work is addressing both types of risks.
The search games played by foraging predators and escaping prey often unfold
in conditions which usually change, possibly under the action of the players. These
conditions, called environment, are here understood in a liberal fashion, being either
external (time of day, for example) or internal (hunger level, for example). The proper
formalism for such situations is the realm of stochastic games [67]. Furthermore, a
classical optimal foraging model would not make the movement of the prey (if any)
a function of the behavior of the predator. Would such two-ways interactions modify
the outcome of the game? If so, in which way? These are the kind of questions we are
interested in. Our aim is to develop a stochastic game framework including simultaneous
decisions of two antagonists during a hide and seek game with multiple bouts in which
the motivation of the predator fluctuates. This works represents therefore the natural
bridge between the commonly used single predator, multiple stationary prey, optimal
foraging theory described earlier and search games.
2.4 Overview of Previous Results
The current paper can be seen as an extension of [36] and [11]; we summarize those
models, calling them respectively the one stage game and the repeated game. Table 2.2
explains most of the important notations used in the different models.
As related notational convention in game theory is to use “he and she” to distin-
guish between the two players: here we will use “he” for the Searcher and “she” for the
Hider, reverting to “it” when we refer to predator and prey animals.
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n total number of locations i, j = 1, . . . , n
k number of locations searched in each period
pi probability of capture if prey found at location i, p = (pi)
hi probability of prey hiding at location i (strategy), h = (hi)
ri probability that location i is searched (strategy), r = (ri)






v the game value, probability of eventual capture
β discount factor
a, b low and high capture probabilities in learning case
()∗ superscript ∗ indicates optimal strategy
Table 2.2: List of common notations
2.4.1 The One Stage game
We now review in more detail the one stage (period) game of [36]. A (stationary)
Hider locates in one of n locations i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n} while the Searcher inspects
k of these, where n and k are parameters of the game. The order of inspection is
not important. If the Searcher inspects the location i chosen by the Hider, the Hider
is captured with a probability pi that depends on the location i. For convenience we
assume that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pn, that is, the locations are numbered in decreasing order
of attractiveness to the Hider. The Searcher wins the game if he finds and then captures
the Hider. The Hider wins if she is not found or if she is found but not captured. So if
the Hider hides at location i and the Searcher inspects a k-subset S (subset of cardinality
k) of N then the payoff P to the maximizing Searcher, the probability that the Searcher
wins, is given by
P (S, i) =
 pi if i ∈ S,0 if i /∈ S. (2.1)
If we say that the payoff to the Hider is the probability she is not found and captured,
then the game has constant sum 1 (the Hider’s payoff is 1− P ).
A mixed Hiding strategy is a probability vector of hiding probabilities h =
(h1, h2, ..., hn) where hi is the probability that the Hider hides at location i. A mixed
strategy for the Searcher is a probability distribution over k-subsets of N . Clearly to
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every such mixed search strategy there is a probability ri that location i is inspected.
Conversely, if we know all the probabilities ri, we can determine the mixed search strat-
egy. This leads us to the following equivalent, and more useful, definition of the mixed
Searcher strategy.
Definition 1. A mixed search strategy is a vector of probabilities r = (r1, r2, ..., rn)
where ri is the probability that the Searcher visits location i, so that
n∑
i=1
ri = k. (2.2)
In this constant sum game, the value v is the probability of capture P, with
best play on both sides. Note that if the Searcher inspects location i when the Hider is
adopting the mixed strategy h, the Searcher wins with probability hi pi, the probability
that the Hider is found multiplied by the probability she is then captured. We will
often consider the mixed hiding strategy called h∗ which makes all these probabilities
the same, that is,
hipi = λ, for all i ∈ N (2.3)
and for some constant λ. We say that h∗ is the Hider strategy which makes all locations








h∗i = λ/pi, i ∈ N . (2.5)
It follows from the formula for λ and the assumption that the pi are increasing in i that
1 ≤ p1/λ ≤ n.
The solution of the game is easy to see in the two extreme cases where k = 1
and where k = n. When k is 1 this is a standard hide-seek game, sometimes called a
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diagonal game. The value of this game is λ, the Hider should adopt h∗ to make all
locations equally attractive, and the Searcher should inspect locations with probabilities
proportional to their capture probabilities pi. On the other hand, when k = n and all
locations are inspected, only the Hider has a strategic choice and she is captured with
probability pi if she chooses location i, so clearly location i = 1 is best for her, with a
value of p1. The surprising finding of [36] is that for small k the solution is like that for
k = 1 and for large k the solution is like that of k = n. The dividing value of k is given
by p1/λ. This result is stated below.
Theorem 1. The solution of the one-stage game described above depends on the value
of k relative to p1/λ.
1. If k < p1/λ then the optimal hiding strategy is h
∗, the optimal search strategy visits
each location i with probability ri = kλ/pi and the value is kλ.
2. If k ≥ p1/λ then the value is p1. The Hider can guarantee paying at most p1 by
always hiding at location 1 and the Searcher can guarantee at least p1 by choosing
r1 = 1 < kλ/p1 and ri ≥ min(kλ/pi, 1) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
This presentation of the one stage game of [36] is a good place to mention the
distinction of our approach with evolutionary game theory. We note that our game is
a big generalization of the so called matching pennies game, where each player chooses
H or T and the maximizer wins if they choose the same and the minimizer wins if they
are different. This is our game with n = 2 locations called H and T, with both capture
probabilities equal to 1 and k = 1 searches. This game is mentioned in Section 4.2 of [71].
After observing that the game is not symmetric it is further observed, “Thus, matching
pennies games fall outside the domain of evolutionary stability analysis.” This applies
equally well to our more general hide-seek-pursuit games, as well as any asymmetric
game (see [64]). Obviously we cannot expect pure strategy solutions (saddle points) in
hide-seek games, as certain knowledge of the hiding place ensures the prey will be found.
However in matrix games such as the one presented here, iterative methods of solution
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are known. An evolutionary approach to search games would indeed be an interesting
and useful contribution, but to our knowledge no attempts in this direction have been
made, and we do not make such an attempt here. In our later stochastic game, the
optimal strategies are indeed obtained by an iterative process (Corollary 5), though not
exactly an evolutionary one.
2.4.2 Repeated Games
In [11], the one stage game was extended to a repeated game. We briefly review the
model and results for the undiscounted and discounted versions of that game here.
The repeated game Gk
During the k looks among the different locations within a single patch, there can be
any of the following three events:
1. If the Searcher does not find the Hider, then the game ends with zero payoff for
the Searcher and a payoff of one to the Hider. (Hider wins.)
2. If the Searcher finds the Hider and captures it, then the game ends with a payoff
of one to the Searcher and a payoff of zero to the Hider. (Searcher wins.)
3. If the Searcher finds the Hider but does not catch it, then the Hider escapes to
another patch and the process restarts. (Game continues.)
Here the payoff PS to the Searcher is the probability that the Hider is eventually





pi + (1− pi) v
= k. (2.6)
The equally attractive hiding strategy is given by
h∗i =
v/k
pi + (1− pi) v
(2.7)
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Note that the “attractiveness” of location i in a repeated game is given by hi [pi + (1− pi) v].
The hiding strategy h∗ is optimal for all k, whereas in the one stage game it was optimal
only if k was below a threshold!
The Discounted Repeated Game
The repeated game can also be studied under the assumption that the payoff is dis-
counted by a discount factor β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, in each stage. If β = 0 we have the one stage
game and if β = 1 we have the undiscounted repeated game. In [11] we have shown that




pi + (1− pi) β v





pi(1− β) + p1β
, (2.9)
and that in this case the strategy h∗ is optimal for the Hider.
Otherwise, the ‘stay at 1’ solution h1 = 1 is optimal for the Hider, with the value
v =
p1
1− β + p1β
. (2.10)
We have also proved the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Consider the repeated discounted game with k looks and a discount factor





pi(1− βk) + p1βk
. (2.11)
If there is a solution βk to equation (2.11), then it is unique and
• If β < βk, then the ‘stay at 1’ strategy h1 = 1 is the optimal strategy for the Hider.
• If β > βk , then the ‘equally attractive’ is the only solution to the game.
19
If equation (2.11) has no solution in [0, 1], then the ‘equally attractive’ strategy
h∗ is the only optimal Hider strategy.
2.5 The Stochastic Game ∆k
We now present our new model. In this section we modify our repeated game model so
that after a prey escapes capture at location i, she may still be captured in the course
of moving to her chosen next location j (possibly the same as i if she chooses not to
move between periods). We assign a fixed probability αi,j , which depends on the two
locations, to this capture probability. The probability αi,j is a reflection of the properties
of the terrain between locations i and j. For example αi,j might be high if the terrain in
between is very open and has high visibility to the predator. In practice, this probability
might depend on choices (such as where to position between periods) of the predator,
but for simplicity we assume here that it is independent of any such choices. Note that
if all the transition capture probabilities αi,j are taken to be 0, then the new stochastic
game model, which we will denote by ∆k, reduces to the previous repeated game model
Gk of ([11]).
To formally define the stochastic game ∆k = ∆k (n, p, αi,j) , we must make two
changes to the notation of the repeated game model. First, we need to add two additional
artificial states, in addition to our n original location states, to indicate ending situations
for the game. If the Hider has not been found at the end of the k searches allowed in
a period, then the Hider wins and we say that the game moves to the artificial state
i = −1. Alternatively, if the Searcher wins because he has found and captured the Hider,
we say that the game moves to the artificial state i = 0. Clearly the n location states
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are non-absorbing (the game continues from such a state) while the two
artificial states i = −1, 0 are absorbing states, where one of the players has won. The
location state i denotes the state of the game when the Hider has been found at location
i but has escaped the pursuing Searcher.
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Our previous models were constant-sum, rather than zero-sum because the pay-
offs to the players were the probabilities that they would win the game. These proba-
bilities sum to 1 rather than to 0. The theory of stochastic games we use here applies to
zero-sum games, so we need to make a simple affine transformation of the payoffs that
takes 1 to 1 and 0 to −1. (This transformation is x→ 2x− 1.) In the new notation the
winner’s payoff is +1 and the loser’s payoff is −1, so the game is zero-sum. To transform
the probability PS that the Searcher wins (payoff in the repeated game) into a constant
sum payoff C, we adopt the monotone increasing affine transformation given by
C = 2PS − 1. (2.12)
Thus when the Searcher wins we have PS = 1 and C = 1; but when the Hider wins we
have PS = 0 and hence C = −1. The same transformations applies as well to the values
v of the repeated and stochastic games. For example a value of v = 0 now means that
with best play either player is equally likely to win the game (the same as the value 1/2
in our previous models). Note that the probability of capture PS satisfies
PS = (1 + C) /2. (2.13)
The dynamics of the stochastic game ∆k (in both the undiscounted and dis-
counted versions) are as follows. The location state i corresponds to the situation where
the Hider has been found at location i and has successfully escaped capture. Her pure
choice is her next location and so her mixed choice variable at i is her distribution
h = hi = hi1, . . . , h
i
n over where to locate in the next period. The choice variable for
the Searcher at state i consists of the k locations to search in the next period, given
that the Hider has just left location i. The Searcher’s mixed strategy from state i can
be represented by the variable r = ri, where rij denotes the probability that location j
is among the locations he will search. Suppose the Hider chooses location j. Then
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1. She is captured before reaching the new location with probability αi,j . Otherwise,
2. With probability 1−rij she will not be found at j, and the next state is the absorbing
state −1 (Hider wins, payoff is -1).
3. With probability rij she will be found at j. In this case
(a) With probability pj she will be captured at j and the next state is 0 (Searcher
wins)
(b) With probability 1 − pj she will not be captured and will have to choose a
new location for hiding. The new state is j.
2.5.1 The undiscounted and discounted stochastic games
Suppose that there exist values vi, i = 1, . . . , n, for the stochastic game when the state
is a location state i, i = 1, . . . , n, . It is a standard matter to find an equation which
relates all the vi. Suppose that at state i the Hider chooses to go to location j and the
Searcher chooses strategy r = ri. Then it is easy to see that the next state is either a
location state j or one of the artificial states −1, 0 with the following probabilities and
payoffs.
next state probability payoff
0 (captured in transit) αi,j 1 (Searcher wins)
0 (found and captured at j) (1− αi,j) rj pj 1 (Searcher wins)
−1 (not found at j) (1− αi,j) (1− rj) −1 (Hider wins)
j (found but not captured at j) (1− αi,j) rj (1− pj) vj (game continues)
It follows that the expected payoff if the Hider goes to location j and the Searcher uses
the search strategy r = ri = (r1, . . . , rn) is given by
αi,j (1) + (1− αi,j) (rjpj (1) + (1− rj) (−1) + rj (1− pj) (vj))
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Consequently the expected payoff if the Hider adopts the mixed strategy h is
given by
C (i, r, h, v) =
n∑
j=1
hj [αi,j + (1− αi,j) (rjpj − (1− rj) + rj (1− pj) vj)] .
Theorem 3. If the values vi exist for all i = 1, . . . , n, then they must satisfy the equations





C (i, r, h, v) .
Existence of a value for ∆k
The theory of stochastic games shows that the game ∆k has a value vector v = (v1, . . . , vn),
where vi is the value of the game starting at location state i. A stationary strategy is a
strategy which chooses actions depending on the current hiding place only.
The game ∆k is two-person zero-sum with finite state and action spaces with a
positive probability to stop for any state and any actions by the players: If the Searcher
does not visit the hiding location the game stops (escape), and if the Searcher visits the
hiding location the game stops (with capture) with probability at least p1 > 0. Thus, we
can use the fundamental result of [65] on stochastic games, that in the above mentioned
conditions equilibrium exists in stationary strategies. This result is valid both for the
undiscounted and the discounted stochastic games so we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. There exist unique values vi , i = 1, . . . , n, for the stochastic game ∆k. This
result holds both for the undiscounted and the discounted version. There exist optimal
stationary strategies for both players.
Value iteration algorithm
This algorithm has been devised by Shapley in his fundamental paper [65]. We now
adapt it to the game ∆k.
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Corollary 5. Consider the following iteration scheme, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
vi (0) is any initial guess. Then for L = 1, 2, . . . , we define iteratively, (2.14)







hj [αi,j + (1− αi,j) (rjpj − (1− rj) + rj (1− pj) (vj (L− 1)))]).
(2.15)
Then limL→∞ vi (L) = vi.This value iteration scheme converges with a geometric rate
(1− p1)L .
This algorithm works for the undiscounted and even faster for the discounted
stochastic game ∆k.
The value at the beginning
At the beginning of the game no location has been chosen yet. The Hider chooses a
location i, i = 1, ..., n and the Searcher chooses a set of k locations. What is the
probability qi of eventual capture in the game under the condition that the prey was
discovered at location i at the first stage? With probability pi (by definition) there is
a successful pursuit and the Hider is captured. With complementary probability 1− pi
the pursuit is not successful, and since the game is in state i (the Hider has escaped
from location i) the definition of vi says that the expected payoff C = vi. By our affine
transformation relating payoff and capture probability, equation (2.13), we have in this
case that PS = (1 + C) /2 = (1 + vi) /2. Thus overall we have
qi = pi + (1− pi)× (1 + vi)/2, (2.16)
Thus, the game at the beginning is equivalent to the one stage game with probability
of capture qi for location i, that is, qi plays the role of what we called pi in the one stage
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game. The solution of this game is thus given by
Theorem 6. The optimal solution of the game ∆k can be obtained from Theorem 1 as
follows:












Then we transform the optimal probability of capture PS into the zero-sum payoff C =
2PS − 1 (see (2.12)).
2.6 A Comparative Example
We now look at the effect of both optimizing (rather than simply random) prey movement
and of adding risk to inter-period prey movement (allowing αij > 0 rather than riskless
αij = 0). We do this we by comparing our models of Section 2.4.2 (repeated games)
and Section 2.5 (stochastic games) with the Markov Decision Process solution to the one
sided optimization of a Searcher against a random Hider, in a simple example with just
two locations.
Consider a patch with two locations (n = 2), p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.8, and k = 1.
In case of capture the payoff is 1 for the Searcher and 0 for the Hider and in case of
ultimate escape the payoff for the Searcher (Hider) is 0 (1) so the ultimate payoff to the
Searcher is the overall probability of capture. Assume that if the Hider was discovered
but not captured she succeeds to reach another patch and the process continues until
capture or ultimate escape. We use the undiscounted case. We denote v as the overall
probability of capture in all the models of our toy example.
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A Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for the Searcher is a framework in
which his actions are optimal based on his knowledge about the current state and the
strategy of the Hider. This state is fixed at the beginning but at any further stage it is
the location at which the Hider was discovered (but not captured) at the previous stage.
We now compare the MDP to the stochastic game version of this model. At first we
neglect the capture risk of the Hider during changing locations, and then we take this
risk into consideration. Then we consider the possibility of inter period capture.
2.6.1 Model without risk when changing location
We now consider the earlier model where between periods the Hider prey can move
between locations without risk of capture, so that all the transition capture probabilities
αij are 0. We first consider that the prey acts randomly and then considers that the prey
acts so as to minimize capture probability. In both cases, we assume that the searching
predator acts to maximize capture probability.
Random prey, optimizing predator (MDP model)
Assume that the Hider always hides randomly and uniformly, i.e., h = (0.5, 0.5), and that
there is no risk for the Hider to change locations. That is, the Hider equiprobably stays
or changes location between periods. In this case the optimal strategy of the Searcher is
to always look at location 2 (or adopt strategy R = (0, 1) in our notation) at each stage.
The ultimate probability of capture v satisfies
v = .5× (.8 + .2× v) + 0, giving v = .4
.9
' 0.44 (2.19)
Optimal play in repeated game model
Here also we assume no risk to change locations, so this is the repeated game ∆. The
optimal strategies are for both players to hide/search at location 1 with probability
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about 0.73 and at location 2 with probability about 0.27. The equation of the value of
the game is given by equation (2.6), so we have
v
p1 + (1− p1) v
+
v
p2 + (1− p2) v






= 1, giving v ' 0.22 (2.21)
Thus by hiding at the better location (location 1) with higher probability (.73
rather than .50) the Hider prey reduces the probability of eventual capture from about
.44 to about .22, that is, by about 50%.
2.6.2 Model with risk when Hider changes locations
We now make the main assumption of this paper, that the Hider can be captured between
periods when moving from location i to location j, with a possibly positive probability
αij . For this example we make the simple assumption that the Hider cannot be captured
if she stays at the same location, αii = 0 for i, j = 1, 2, but that any move between
distinct locations has capture probability 0.3, that is αij = .3 for i 6= j. State i = 1, 2
corresponds to the event that the Hider has been discovered but not caught at location
i and vi is the overall probability of capture at that state.
Hider moves randomly, Searcher optimizes (MDP model)
We assume that from any state i = 1, 2, the Hider moves equiprobably to either location
and that the Hider starts equiprobably at either location (not equiprobably in either
state). Clearly in this case the Searcher should always look at location 2, where he has
a higher chance of capturing the prey if she is there. We therefore have the following
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equations for v1 and v2,
v1 = .5× 0 + .5× [.3 + .7× (.8 + .2v2)] (2.22)
v2 = .5× (.8 + .2v2) + .5× .3, giving (2.23)
v1 ' 0.47, v2 ' .61 (2.24)
If the Hider starts in location 1, she will not be found and so the payoff is 0.
If she starts at location 2, she will be found and she will be captured with probability
p2 = .8. She will not be captured with probability .2 in which case the eventual capture
probability is v2. So overall the capture probability in this scenario at the beginning of
the game is given by
v = .5 (0) + .5 (.8 + .2 v2) ' 0.46 (2.25)
Both Hider and Searcher optimize (stochastic game model)
We now analyze the model of this paper, covering the scenario with inter-period capture
risk and two optimizing players in a stochastic game. State i = 1, 2 corresponds to
the event that the Hider has been discovered but not caught at location i and vi is the
overall probability of capture at that location (this is different from the notation in
chapter 5). For the stochastic game we have the following equations, where the minimum
is with respect to the Searcher looking at location 1 (left) or location 2 (right):
v1 = max min
0≤x≤1
[x(.1 + .9v1) + (1− x) (.3) ; (1− x) (.3 + .7(.8 + .2v2))] (2.26)
v2 = max min
0≤y≤1
[y(.8 + .2v2) + (1− y) (.3) ; (1− y) (.3 + .7(.1 + .9v1))], (2.27)
where x and y are the probabilities that the Hider will stay at the same node after
escaping capture at locations 1 and 2 respectively. The solution is v1 ' .39 and v2 ' .45,
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with x ' .60, y ' .27. Note that x, the probability to stay at location 1, is smaller than
the corresponding result in the model without risk in moving. This is, obviously, counter
intuitive and will be later explained in the Section 2.7.
At the beginning of the game, the overall probabilities of eventual capture if the
Hider is discovered at location 1 is
q1 = p1 + (1− p1)× v1 = .44 (2.28)
and at location 2 is
q2 = p2 + (1− p2)× v2 = .89. (2.29)






, the same as the optimal search strategy for the first stage. Thus the overall



















The Hider thus reduces the probability of capture from about 0.46 for the random
strategy to about 0.29 when playing optimally in the stochastic game. This is a reduction
of about 37% if she uses the optimal hiding strategy, a function of the predator’s actions
rather than a random choice of locations. Either if we neglect the risk of moving, or if
we take it into account, there is thus a marked difference in the probabilities of capture
and escape between the stochastic and the single agent games, as used in most optimal
foraging theory.
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2.7 Relocation Probability and Relocation Risk
In Section 2.6 we noted the seemingly counter intuitive numerical result that the proba-
bility of moving increased when such a move became more risky. We now present a very
simple numerical example that will enable us to understand why it happens. Assume we
have two locations with probability of capture p1 = p2 = 1− ε and k = 1. Consider first
the repeated game with no risk of moving. The optimal strategy for the Hider is always
to hide at each location with probability 1/2. Now consider the same example with risk
α = 1/2 for changing location. If the Hider has been discovered but not captured then
it is easy to see that she should make both locations equally attractive for the Searcher
so she chooses the probability to stay at her present location equal to 1/3. This means
she will be captured in transit with probability (2/3)α = 1/3, she will be at location 1
in the next period with probability 1/3, and she will be at location 2 with probability
(2/3) (1− α) = 1/3. So, conditional on her still playing the game, she is equally likely
to be at either location. This choice guarantees her to lose the game with probability
about 2/3 which is the minimum possible, while staying with probability 1/2 leads to
losing with probability 3/4. The paradox is that we have the same (simple) model but
increasing the risk of moving also increases the probability of moving.
We now give an example which makes this phenomenon simpler, without any
numbers. We consider the following general case of two identical locations with a com-
mon capture probability p = p1 = p2 < 1. We suppose that staying still is safe
(α11 = α12 = 0) and relocating either way has the same probability α of being cap-
tured. The symmetry of the two locations ensures that v1 = v2 = v. From state 1 (after
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a successful escape at location 1) the game matrix is as follows:
stay at 1 move to 2
look in 1 p+ (1− p) v a
look in 2 0 a+ (1− a) (p+ (1− p) v)
Payoff Matrix when Hider starts at location 1
The existence of a value for this game, which we denote by v, follows from Shapley’s
result, our Theorem 4. First note that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose the
Hider stays at location 1 with probability q, moving to location 2 with complementary
probability 1 − q. The equation obtained by equating the payoffs (eventual capture
probabilities) when the Searcher looks at location 1 (top row, left side of equation) and
location 2 (bottom row, right side of equation) is given by
q (p+ (1− p) v) + (1− q) (a) = q (0) + (1− q) (a+ (1− a) (p+ (1− p) v)) , or
q (p+ (1− p) v) = (1− q) (1− a) (p+ (1− p) v) , or




, which is decreasing in a. (2.32a)
Note that the optimal probability q of staying at 1 (or at 2, by symmetry) does not
depend on the common capture probability p or the common value v. The optimal
probability is q = 1/2 when there is no relocation risk (a = 0). This makes sense
because it makes the Hider distribution most random. The optimal probability 1− q of
relocating is given by





, which approaches 1 as a→ 1.
We note that this symmetric model extends easily to n identical locations, where
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by symmetry of locations the Hider has the two choices: remain at her current location
or move to a randomly selected new location. For n such locations the formula for
remaining becomes q = (1− a)/(n− a).
Thus the prey may have more incentive to relocate when this move becomes
riskier. We note that a somewhat similar observation was made, in a slightly different
context, in [7] and [8]. There, a prey had to decide when to change locations when
facing a predator who might either be in cruising search mode or in ambush mode. If
the predator was in ambush mode then changing locations resulted in capture. However
it was found that as the unsearched region decreased in size, the predator was more likely
to be in ambush mode (so a higher “relocation cost” for the prey), but nevertheless the
predator optimally increased her likelihood of relocating. The specifics of the calculations
are different than those given here, as the model is only partly similar. The idea is that
the relocation cost α in the current model has some similarity to the ambush frequency
in the earlier papers in that both incur a risk to a prey who changes location. It would
be useful to have an additional explanation for the counter intuitive result that could be
put purely in words, without the necessity of a mathematical model.
2.8 Learning the Capture Probabilities
It is a natural question to ask how the predator and prey know the capture probabilities
pi; can they be learned? To answer this question we give a simple learning model. We
consider the simplest case that allows for learning: two locations and two (or more)
periods and only k = 1 location to be searched in each period. We assume that at each
location the capture probabilities are known to be a or b equiprobably and independently,
with a < b. (If a = b there is nothing to be learned.) This means locations either have a
low capture probability or a high capture probability, only it is not known which. At a
location where the prey has escaped j times, the conditional probability that the capture
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probability is a (low) is denoted by g (j) , where g (0) = 1/2 and by Bayes Law,
g (j) =
(1− a)j
(1− b)j + (1− a)j
, with lim
j→∞
g (j)↗ 1. (2.33)
In other words, each successful escape from a location makes it more likely that it has a
low capture probability and hence makes it more attractive to the prey and hence also
to the predator. The effective capture probability, denoted p̂, is initially given simply by
p̂ (0) = (a+ b) /2, and more generally by
p̂ (j) = g (j) a+ (1− g (j)) b = a (1− a)
j + b (1− b)j
(1− a)j + (1− b)j
↘ a (2.34)
For example, if a = 1/3 and b = 2/3, then the first values of g (j) given by 1/2, 2/3,




and the p̂ (j) by 1/2, 4/9, .400, .370, 0.353, 0.343, 0.338.
Note that when only one location is searched in each period, the payoff matrix
has 0 entries off the diagonal (when Hider is not in the searched location) so the matrix
is a diagonal matrix. For two locations this is a matrix of the form
 d1 0
0 d2
 , with value λ (d1, d2) = (1/d1 + 1/d2)−1 (2.35)
and optimal probability (for both players) of strategy i is given by λ (d1, d2) /di. So in
the final period of a game, if there have been i escapes from location 1 and j escapes from
location 2, the payoff matrix of this one stage game, called Li,j,1, is simply λ (p̂ (i) , p̂ (j)) .
More generally let Li,j,m be the learning game where location 1 has had i escapes, 2 has
had j escapes, and there are m more plays of the game. These games are recursively
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described by the matrix
Li,j,m =
 p̂ (i) + (1− p̂ (i)) Li+1,j,m−1 0
0 p̂ (j) + (1− p̂ (j)) Li,j+1,m−1
 , with value
v (i, j,m) = λ (p̂ (i) + (1− p̂ (i)) v(i+ 1, j,m− 1)) , p̂ (j) + (1− p̂ (j)) v(i, j + 1,m− 1),
In the game Li,j,m it is easy to show that the optimal probability of hiding/searching in
location 1 is given by
xi,j,m = v (i, j,m) / (p̂ (i)) + (1− p̂ (i)) v (i+ 1, j,m− 1) . (2.36)
For our example a = 1/3, b = 2/3, the values v (0, 0,m) for games with m = 1, . . . , 6
periods are given by
λ (1/2, 1/2) =
1




' 0.309, 0.324, 0.327, 0.328, 0.32895, 0.3290
(2.37)
For the two-stage game m = 2, the players randomize between the symmetric locations 1
and 2 in the first period, and assuming we name the location of escape in the first period
as location 1, they go back to the same location in the second period with probability
x1,0,1 = 9/17 > 1/2. Now suppose that there are three stages. Clearly in the first stage
the players have no choice but to locate equiprobably to the two locations. But how do
they play in the second stage (assume there was an escape at location 1) if they know
it is a three stage game? In this case the probability of choosing location 1 (for both
hiding and searching) is given by x1,0,2 = 99/191 < 9/17 = x1,0,1. This says that the
presence of an additional final (third) period decreases the probability of going back to
the same location as the escape in the previous period, but this probability is still greater
than one half. In fact we find this phenomenon is true in general, learning reduces the
bias toward returning to locations one has escaped from. This phenomenon obviously
34
requires three stages in our model. Using numerical methods, this can be shown to be
true for all a and b.
It is useful to compare the learning game with low and high capture probabilities
a and b with the similar non-learning game with a fixed and known capture probability
(a+ b) /2 which is the effective capture probability of the learning game. We consider
both in the setting of a two stage game with identical locations. If the capture probability
in the non learning game is c at both locations, then the value of the second stage is
given by λ (c, c) = 1/ (1/c+ 1/c) = c/2 and hence in the first stage has value (1/2)(c ·
1 + (1 − c) (c/2)) = (3− c) c/4 (half the time they go to the same location, capture
(payoff 1) has probability c and escape (with payoff c/2 from previous calculation) has
payoff c/2. For the example a = 1/3, b = 2/3, c = 1/2 the non learning game has
value (3− 1/2) (1/2) /4 = 5/16 = 0.3125 while the learning game has the lower value
v0,0,2 = 21/68 ' 0.3088. This means that the capture probability is lower (better for the
Hider) when there is learning. We show that this observation holds in general, at least
for the two stage game.
Proposition 1. When there are two stages and identical locations (a priori), the optimal
capture probability (value) is lower in the learning game with capture probabilities a <
b < 1 than in the game where the fixed capture probability is set equal to the effective
capture probability p̂ (0) = c = (a+ b) /2. That is, v (0, 0, 2) < (3− c) c/4.
Proof. After some algebraic simplification, the difference in the values between the no
learning and learning games can be written as
(3− c) c
4
− v (0, 0, 2) = (a− b)
2 (2− a− b) (a+ b)
16 (3(a− a2) + 3(b− b2) + 1(a+ b− 2ab))
> 0, (2.38)
because all the factors in the numerator are positive, and for the denominator we note
that a > a2, b > b2 and a+ b > 2a > 2ab. 
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An interesting question concerns the variability of the capture probabilities. For
example in a final period, is it better for the Hider to have escaped twice from one
location (and face varied capture probabilities p̂ (2) and p̂(0) = (a+ b)/b) or once from
each location (with an effective capture probability p̂ (1) at each location)? In other
words, what is the sign of v(2, 0, 1)− v(1, 1, 1)? It turns out that the answer depends in
a simple way on the size of the two probabilities a and b. If a + b > 1, then the Hider
prefers the low variability case L1,1,1; if a+ b < 1 the Hider prefers the high variability
case L2,0,1; if a+ b = 1 the players are indifferent between these cases. In particular we
have the following.
Proposition 2. Highly varying capture probabilities favor the Searcher if these probabili-
ties are high; otherwise they favor the Hider. In particular, the sign of v(2, 0, 1)−v(1, 1, 1)
is positive if a+ b > 1; negative if a+ b < 1 and zero if a+ b = 1.
Proof. The difference v(2, 0, 1)− v(1, 1, 1) is given by the fraction
(a− b)4 (a+ b− 1)
2 (2− a− b)
(
3a3 + a2 (b− 6) + a (b− 2)2 + b (4− 6b+ 3b2)
) . (2.39)
The multinomial in the denominator has a minimum of 0 at a = b = 1, so for 0 < a <
b ≤ 1 the sign of the fraction is the sign of a+ b−1, as claimed. (Note that if we allowed
a = b then the escapes are irrelevant to current probabilities and the difference would
also be 0.) 
A normal form game (not a dynamic game) which considers this type of learning
was analyzed in [14].
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2.9 Discussion
Biology, economics, computer science and studies of human behavior have since long
considered stochastic games ([26],[35]). A recent important perspective is presented by
[67]. What is therefore new here is application to the context of search games and
behavioral ecology. Hence, our work has implications beyond behavioral ecology for any
situation described by hide and seek games, from ecology, immune systems to computer
science [36]. We are now in the position to assess the change in success of attack and
escape in stochastic search games, compared to the situation in which one player is
against another one which is moving randomly. This later case is known to be equivalent
of games in which only one player is behaving optimally, a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), see [61] or [62]. Of course it is necessary to observe that our modelling is
appropriate only in the case of low densities for both predator and prey, allowing each
to assume that there is at most one of the opposite type in the search region.
While we have given a complete solution to these problems in the text, the specific
example of Section 2.6 is sufficient to indicate some differences in the capture time for
differing assumptions. See Table 2.3.
capture on transition no transition capture % reduction
random prey, MDP .46 .44 4%
optimizing prey, Game .29 (stochastic game) .22 (repeated game) 24%
% reduction 37% 50%
Table 2.3: Expected eventual capture probabilities v for various assumptions
It is of course obvious that optimizing prey do better (lower v) than random
prey and that prey would benefit from having a risk free transition between locations
between periods. In general, the prey reduces the capture probability by about 37-50%
if she uses the optimal hiding strategy rather than moving and/or hiding randomly.
There is thus a marked difference in the probabilities of capture and escape between our
(repeated or stochastic) game theoretic models and single agent predator optimization
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models, as used in most optimal foraging theory. This marked difference extends to the
use of space by the protagonists, as in our no transition capture example of Section 2.6
(middle column) the predator should always visit location 2 in the first case, and should
concentrate its visits on the first location in the second case: a complete reversal of
distribution of effort as function of the tightness of the interaction!
These differences are the explanation why organisms tend to act according to the
other player’s actions and why the stochastic/repeated search game approach supersedes
the classical optimal foraging one for modelling such interactions: the more complex
modelling approach reflects the complex, multi-step trajectories of the antagonists as
we observe them. The myriad of delicate and intricate biochemical, physiological or
behavioral adaptations of prey for escaping predators and of predators for successfully
attacking and subduing their prey [66] show that natural selection is acting on all these
traits. A stochastic game formulation is thus definitely required when players do behave
according to what the other is doing. The model can be developed in two promising
directions. First, we did not consider prey fatigue or more complex situations in which
prey balance risk of predation with risk of starvation. A refined model taking fatigue
into account would have then three state variables – motivation, fatigue, and the recent
location of encounter and its development would follow lines similar as the ones we have
proposed.
Finally, our model is a zero-sum game. One may argue that a real game between
a predator and a prey is not a zero-sum game, as the predator is running after its dinner
while the prey is running for its life. This is an important if difficult aspect to deal with.
Indeed, while non-zero sum stochastic games have been modeled only a few years after
zero-sum games were developed, the level of complexity is strongly increased. The value
of the game cannot indeed be taken as granted, in contrast to zero-sum games. For
search games, implementing non-zero sum games represents a virgin and much needed
field. We advocate future analysis of the following non-zero sum model. In the single
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period problem we could require the predator to search the k locations sequentially. If
the prey is found on the j’th search and successfully pursued the payoff to the predator
would be 1 − jc for some small fixed search cost c, modeling the effort or energy of a
search. The cost could also be location dependent, ci. The prey also might prefer later
capture within a period in such a model, but this would still not make it zero-sum, as
survival would be more significant.
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Chapter 3
A Normal Form Game Model of
Search and Pursuit
3.1 Introduction
Traditionally, search games and pursuit games have been studied by different people,
using different techniques. Pursuit games are usually of perfect information and are
solved in pure strategies using techniques involving differential equations. Search games,
on the other hand, typically require mixed strategies. Both Pursuit and Search games
were initially modelled and solved by Rufus Isaacs in his book [42]. The first attempt to
combine these games was the elegant paper of Gal and Casas [36]. In their model, a hider
(a prey animal in their biological setting) begins the game by choosing among a finite set
of locations in which to hide. The searcher (a predator) then searches (or inspects) k of
these locations, where k is a parameter representing the time or energy available to the
searcher. If the hiding location is not among those inspected, the hider wins the game. If
the searcher does inspect the location containing the hider, then a pursuit game ensues.
Each location has its own capture probability, known to both players, which represents
how difficult the pursuit game is for the searcher. If the search-predator successfully
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pursues and captures the hider-prey, the searcher is said to win the game. This is a
simple but useful model that encompasses both the search and the pursuit portions of
the predator-prey interaction.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, we relax the assumption of Gal and
Casas that all locations are equally easy to search. We give each location its own search
time and we give the searcher a total search time. Thus he can inspect any set of lo-
cations whose individual search times sum to less than or equal to the searcher’s total
search time, a measure of his resources or energy (or perhaps the length of daylight
hours, if he is a day predator). We consider two scenarios. The first scenario concerns
n hiding locations, in which the search time at each location is inversely proportionate
with the capture probability at that location. In the second, we consider that there
are many hiding locations, but they come in only two types, identifiable to the players.
Locations within a type have the same search time and the same capture probability.
There may be any number of locations of each type.
The second part of the paper relaxes the assumption that the players know the
capture probability of every location precisely. Rather, we assume that a distribution of
capture probabilities is known. The players can learn these probabilities more precisely
by repeated play of the game. We analyze a simple model with only two locations and
two periods, where one location may be searched in each period. While simple, this
model shows how the knowledge that the capture probabilities will be updated in the
second period (lowered at a location where there was a successful escape) affects the
optimal play of the game.
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3.2 Literature Review
An important contribution of the paper of Gal and Casas discussed in the Introduction
is the analysis involves finding a threshold of locations beyond which the searcher can
inspect. If this is sufficiently high, for example if he can inspect all locations, then
the hider adopts the pure strategy of choosing the location for which the probability
of successful pursuit is the smallest. On the other hand, if k is below this threshold
(say k = 1), the hider mixes his location so that the probability of being at a location
multiplied by its capture probability (the desirability of inspecting such a location) is
constant over all locations.
The paper of Gal and Casas [36] requires that the searcher knows his resource
level (total search time) k. In a related but not identical model of Lin and Singham [49]
it is shown that sometimes the optimal searcher strategy does not depend on k. This
paper is not directly related to our findings but the reader may find it useful to know
the distinction between this paper and ours.
Alpern, Gal, and Casas [11] extended the Gal-Casas model by allowing repeated
play in the case where the searcher chose the right location but the pursuit at this hiding
location is not successful. They found that the hider should choose his location more
randomly when the pursuing searcher is more persistent.
More recently, Hellerstein, Lidbetter, and Pirutinsky [48] introduced an algorithm
similar to that of the fictitious play where the searcher recursively updates his optimal
strategy after knowing the response of the opponent’s. They apply this technique to
games similar to those we consider here. Their algorithm is likely to prove a powerful
technique for solving otherwise intractable search games.
More generally, search games are discussed in Alpern and Gal [10] and search and
pursuit problems related to robotics are categorized and discussed in Chung, Hollinger
and Isler [28].
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3.3 Single Period Game with General Search Times
Consider a game where the searcher wishes to find the hider at one of n locations and
then attempt to pursue and capture it, within a limited amount of resources denoted by
k. Each location i has two associated parameters: a search time ti required to search
the location and a capture probability pi > 0 that if found at location i the searcher’s
pursuit will be successful. Both ti and pi are known to the searcher and the hider.
The game G (n, t, p, k) , where t = (t1, . . . , tn) and p = (p1, . . . , pn) represent the
time and capture vectors, is played as follows. The hider picks a location i ∈ N ≡
{1, 2, ..., n} in which to hide. The searcher can then inspect search locations in any
order, as long as their total search time does not exceed k. The searcher wins (payoff =
1) if he finds and then captures the hider; otherwise the hider wins (payoff = 0). We can
say that this game is a constant sum game where the value V = V (k) is the probability
that the predator wins with given total search time k.
A mixed strategy for the hider is a distribution vector h ∈ H, where
H =
{






A pure strategy for the searcher is a set of locations A ⊂ N which can be searched
in total time k. His pure strategy set is denoted by a(k), where




The statement above simply states that a searcher can inspect any set of locations for
which the total search time does not exceed his maximum search time k. A mixed search
strategy is a probabilistic choice of these sets.
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The payoff P from the perspective of the maximizing searcher is given by
P (A, i) =

pi if i ∈ A, and
0 if i /∈ A.
As part of the analysis of the game, we may wish to consider the best response
problem faced by a searcher who knows the distribution h of the hider. The “benefit”
of searching each location i is given by bi = hi pi, the probability that he finds and
then captures the hider (prey). Thus when h is known, the problem for the searcher
essentially is to choose the set of locations A ∈ α (k) which maximizes b(A) =
∑
i∈A bi.
This is a classic Knapsack problem from the Operations Research literature (A seminal
book of the Knapsack problem is by Kellerer, Pferschy and Pisinger [45]). The objects
to be put into the knapsack are the locations i. Each has a ‘weight’ ti and a benefit
bi. He wants to fill the knapsack with as much total benefit subject to a total weight
restriction of k.
The knapsack approach illustrates a simple domination argument: the searcher
should never leave enough room (time) in his knapsack to put in another object. However
to better understand this observation, we show the definition of Weakly dominant below
Definition 2. Strategy X weakly dominates strategy Y iff (I) X never provides a lower
payoff than Y against all combinations of opposing strategies and (II) there exists at
least one combination of strategies for which the payoffs for X and Y are equal.
Having stated this, we write this simple observation as follows.
Lemma 7. Fix k. The set A ∈ α (k) is weakly dominated by the set A′ ∈ α (k) if A ⊂ A′
and there is a location j ∈ A′ −A.
Proof. If i is in both A or i is not in A′, then P (A, i) = P (A′, i) . If i ∈ A′ − A then
P (A′, i) = pi > 0 = P (A, i) . 
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3.3.1 An example
To illustrate the general game we consider an example with n = 4 locations. The search
times are given by t = (5, 3, 4, 7) and the respective capture probabilities are given by
p = (.1, .2, .15, .4) . In this example it is easiest to name the locations by their search
time, so for example the capture probability at location 7 is 0.4. The searcher has total
search time given by k = 7, so he can search any single location or the pair {3, 4} . The
singleton sets {3} and {4} are both dominated by {3, 4} . We put the associated capture
time next to the name of each location. Thus the associated reduced matrix game is
simply
A\location 5 (.1) 3 (.2) 4 (.15) 7 (.4)
{5} .1 0 0 0
{7} 0 0 0 .4
{3, 4} 0 .2 .15 0
Solving the matrix game using online solver (Avis, et.al. [17]) shows that the prey
hides in the four locations with probabilities (12/23, 0, 8/23, 3/23) while the searcher in-
spects {5} with probability 12/23, {7} with probability 3/23, and {3, 4} with probability
8/23. The value of the game, that is, the probability that the predator-searcher finds
and captures the prey-hider, is 6/115. Our approach in this paper is not to solve games
in the numerical fashion, but rather to give general solutions for certain classes of games,
as Gal and Casas did for the games with ti = 1.
3.3.2 The game with ti constant
Choosing all the search times ti the same, say 1, we may restrict k to integers. This
is the original game introduced and solved by Gal and Casas [36]. Since the ti are the
same, we may order the locations by their capture probabilities, either increasing or
decreasing. Here we use the increasing order of the original paper. Clearly if k = 1
the hider will make sure that all the locations are equally good for the searcher (pihi =
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constant) and if k = n the hider knows he will be found so he will choose the location
with the smallest capture probability (here location 1). The nice result says that there
is a threshold value for k which divides the optimal hiding strategies into two extreme
types.
Proposition 3 (Gal-Casas [36]). Consider the game G (n, t, p, k) where ti = 1 for all
i and the locations are ordered so that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Define λ =
∑n
i=1 1/pi.
The value of this game is given by min (kλ, p1) . If k < p1/λ then the unique optimal
hiding distribution is hi = λ/pi, i = 1, . . . , n. If k ≥ p1/λ then the unique optimal hiding
strategy is to hide at location 1.
3.3.3 The game with ti = i, pi decreasing, k = n odd.
We now consider games with ti = i and pi decreasing. In some sense locations with
higher indices i are better for the hider in that they take up more search time and have
a lower capture probability. Indeed if the searcher has enough resource k to search all
the locations (k =
∑n
i=1 ti = n (n+ 1) /2) then of course the hider should simply hide
at location n and keep the value down to pn. Note that if k < n, the hider can win
simply by hiding at location n, which takes time tn = n to search. When k = 0, then
the searcher cannot inspect any location and so the hider wins (Payoff = 0). We give a
complete solution for the smallest nontrivial amount of resources (total search time) of




j=m+1 1/pj ; h̄j = 1/ (pjS (p)).
Proposition 4. Consider the game G (n, t, p, k) , where ti = i, pi is decreasing in i and
k = n = 2m+ 1. Then
1. An optimal strategy for the searcher is to choose the set {j, n− j} with probability
1/ (pj S (p)) for j = m+ 1, . . . , n.
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2. An optimal strategy for the hider is to choose location j with probability h̄j for
j ≥ m+ 1 and not to choose locations j ≤ m at all.
3. The value of the game is V = 1S(p) .
Proof. Suppose the searcher adopts the strategy suggested above. Any location i that
the hider chooses belongs to one of the sets of the form {j, n− j} for j = m+ 1, . . . , n,
where the set {n, 0} denotes the set {n} . Since for j ≥ m + 1 we have j > n − j
and the pi are decreasing, the hider is better off choosing location j. In this case he is
found with probability 1/ (pj S (p)) and hence he is captured with probability at least
pj (1/ (pj S (p))) = 1/S (p) .
Suppose the hider adopts the hiding distribution suggested above. Note that no
pure search strategy can inspect more than one of the locations j ≥ m+1. Suppose that
location j is inspected. Then the probability that the searcher finds and captures the
hider is given by h̄jpj = 1/ (pjS (p)) pj = 1/S (p) . It follows that S (p) is the value of
the game. 
It is natural to also analyse if Proposition 4 still holds true for k = n = even
number. For the simplicity of our notation and better readability of Proposition 4, we
decided to write this separate section for even number. In the case where k = n = even,
the solution is exactly the same as their odd counterpart. More specifically k = n = 2m
has the same value and optimal strategies as k = n = 2m+ 1. However, it is important
to note that in the even case, both the searcher’s and hider’s optimal strategy is unique.
For instance, k = n = 4 has the same value and optimal strategies as k = n = 5. The
same can be said for 6 and 7, 8 and 9, etc.
Corollary 8. Assuming the pi are strictly decreasing in i, the hider strategy h̄ given
above is uniquely optimal, but the searcher strategy is not.
Proof. Let h∗ 6= h̄ be a hiding distribution. We must have h∗j + h∗n−j > h̄j + h̄n−j =
1/ (pjS (p)) for some j ≥ m + 1; otherwise the total probability given by h∗ would be
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less than 1. Against such a distribution h∗, suppose that the searcher inspects the two














1/ (pjS (p)) this means the searcher wins with probability at least pj (1/ (pjS (p))) =
1/S (p) and hence h∗ is not optimal.
Next, consider the searcher strategy which gives the same probability as above
for all the sets {j, n− j} for j ≥ m + 2 but gives some of the probability assigned to
{m+ 1,m} to the set {m+ 1,m− 1} . Let’s say the probability of {m+ 1,m− 1} is a
small positive number ε. The total probability of inspecting location m+1 (and all larger
locations) has not changed. The probability of inspecting location m has gone down by
ε. So the only way the new searcher strategy could fail to be optimal is potentially when
the hider chooses location m. In this case the probability that the searcher wins is given
by
((1/ (pm+1 S (p)))− ε) pm.
Comparing this to the value of the game, we consider the difference







Since the first term on the right is positive because pm > pm−1, the difference will be
positive for sufficiently small positive ε. 
We will now consider an example to show how the solution changes as k goes up
from the solved case of k = n. We conjecture that there exists a threshold with respect
to k in which above that threshold, the hider ’s optimal strategy is to hide at location
n. To determine that threshold we use the following idea.
Proposition 5. The game G (n, p, t, k) has value v = pn if and only if the value v
′ of
the game G (n− 1, (p1, . . . , pn−1) , (1, 2, . . . , n− 1) , k − n) (with the last location removed
and resources reduced by n) is at least pn.
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Proof. Suppose v = pn. Every search set with positive probability must include location
n, otherwise simply hiding there implies v < pn. So the remaining part of every search
set has k′ = k−n. With this amount of resources, the searcher must find the hider in the
first n locations with probability at least pn, which is what is stated in the Proposition.
Otherwise, the searcher will either have to not search location n certainly (which gives
v < pn) or not search the remaining locations with enough resources to ensure v ≥ pn.

3.3.4 An example with k = 10, n = 5.
Consider the example where p = (.5, .4, .3, .2, .1) with k = 10, n = 5. Here pn = .1. The
game with p′ = (.5, .4, .3, .2) and k′ = k − n = 5 has value at least .1 because of the
equiprobable search strategy of {1, 4} and {2, 3}. Here each location in the new game is
inspected with the same probability 1/2 and consequently the best the hider can do is to
hide in the best location 4, and then the searcher wins with probability (1/2) (.2) = .1.
It follows from Proposition 5 that the original game has the minimum possible value of
v = pn = p5 = .1.
3.3.5 Illustrative examples
In this section we will use an example to further illustrate Proposition 4 and Corollary
8.
First, we consider the game where k = n = 5, ti = i, and p = (.5, .4, .3, .2, .1) .
The game matrix, excluding dominated search strategies, is given by
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A\location 1 2 3 4 5
{5} 0 0 0 0 .1
{1, 4} .5 0 0 .2 0
{2, 3} 0 .4 .3 0 0
{1, 3} .5 0 .3 0 0
{1, 2} .5 .4 0 0 0
The unique solution for the optimal hiding distribution is (0, 0, 2/11, 3/11, 6/11)
and the value is 6/110 = 1/ (1/.3 + 1/.2 + 1/.1) ' .055. The optimal search strategy
mentioned in Proposition 4 is to play {5} , {1, 4} and {2, 3} with respective probabilities
6/11, 3/11 and 2/11. Another strategy is to play {5} and {1, 4} the same but to play
{2, 3} and {1, 3} with probabilities 3/22 and 1/22. It is of interest to see how the solution
of the game changes when k increases from k = n = 5 to higher values. We know that
we need go no higher than k = 10 from Proposition 5 because in the game on locations
1 to 4 with k′ = 10 − 5 = 5, the searcher can inspect {4, 1} with probability 2/3 and
{3, 2} with probability 1/3 to ensure winning with probability at least 1/10 = p5.
So we know the solution of the game for k = 5 and k ≥ 10. The following table
3.1 gives the value of the game and the unique optimal hiding distribution for these and
intermediate values. (The optimal search strategies are varied and we do not list them,
though they are easily calculated.)
k\i 1 2 3 4 5 Value
5 0 0 2/11 3/11 6/11 3/55 ' 0.0545
6 0 0 2/11 3/11 6/11 3/55 ' 0.0545
6 0 0 0 1/3 2/3 1/15 ' 0.0667
8 0 0 0 1/3 2/3 1/15 ' 0.0667
9 0 3/37 4/37 6/37 24/37 18/185 ' 0.0943
≥ 10 0 0 0 0 1 1/10 = 0.1
Table 3.1: Optimal hiding distribution and values, k ≥ 5
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We know that the value must be nondecreasing in k, but we see that it is not
strictly increasing. Roughly speaking (but not precisely), the hider restricts towards
fewer and better locations as k increases, staying always at the best location 5 for
k ≥ 10. However there is the anomalous distribution for k = 9 which includes sometime
hiding at location 2.
3.3.6 Game with two types of locations
In this section we analyse a more specific scenario where all available hiding locations
are of two types. This model might be vaguely applied to military practices. Suppose a
team of law enforcement is to capture a hiding fugitive in an apartment complex. Then
all possible hiding locations can be reduced to a number of types, e.g. smaller rooms
have similar shorter search times and higher capture probability than a parking lot. Here
we solve the resulting search-pursuit game.
Suppose there are two types of locations (hiding places). Type 1 takes time t1
= 1 (this is a normalization) to search, while type 2 takes time t2 = τ to search, with
τ being an integer. Now let type 1 locations have capture probability p while type 2
locations have capture probability q. Moreover, suppose there are a locations of type 1
and b locations of type 2. The searcher has total search time k. To simplify our results
we assume that k is small enough such that a ≥ k (the searcher can restrict all his
searches to type 1) and bτ ≥ k (he can also restrict all his searches to type 2 locations).
Let m = bk/τc be the maximum number of type 2 locations that can be searched.
The searcher’s strategies are to search j = 0, 1, . . . ,m type 2 locations (and hence k− τj
locations of type 1). Since all locations of a given type are essentially the same, the
decision for the hider is simply the probability y to hide at a randomly chosen location
of type 1 (and hence hide at a randomly chosen location of type 2 with probability 1−y).
























pyτ = 0, or
y = ȳ ≡ aq
aq + bpτ
For y = ȳ, the capture probability is given by
P (j, ȳ) =
pqk
aq + bpτ
By playing y = ȳ, the hider ensures that the capture probability (payoff) does
not exceed P (j, ȳ).
We now consider how to optimize the searcher’s strategy. Suppose the searcher
searches j locations of type 2 with probability xj , j = 0, 1, . . . ,m. If the hider is at a



















is the mean number of searches at type 2 locations. Similarly, if the hider is at a type 1



































So for any probability distribution over the pure strategies j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} with mean












To summarize, we have shown the following.
Proposition 6. Suppose all the hiding locations are of two types: a locations of type
1 with search time 1 and capture probability p; b locations of type 2 with search time τ
and capture probability q. Suppose a and b are large enough so the searcher can do all
his searching at a single location type, that is, k ≤ max(a, τb). Then the unique optimal
strategy for the hider is to hide in a random type 1 location with probability ȳ = aqaq+bpτ
and in a random type 2 location with probability 1 − ȳ. Note that this is independent
of k. A strategy for the searcher which inspects j locations of type 2 (and thus, k − jτ
for type 1) with probability xj is optimal if and only if the mean number ̂ =
∑m
j=0 jxj ,
m = bk/τc of type 2 locations inspected is given by ̂ = pbkbpτ+aq . If this number is an
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integer, then the searcher has an optimal pure strategy. The value of the game is given
by pqkaq+bpτ .
3.4 Game Where Capture Probabilities are Unknown But
Learned
In this section we determine how the players can learn the values of the capture prob-
abilities over time, starting with some a priori values and increasing these at locations
from which there have been successful escapes. This of course requires that the game is
repeated. Here we consider the simplest model, just two rounds. So after a successful
escape in the second round, we consider that the hider-prey has won the game (Payoff
0). More rounds of repeated play are considered in Gal, Alpern,Casas [11], but learning
is not considered there.
We consider only two hiding locations, one of which may be searched in each of
the two rounds. If the hider is found at location i, he is captured with a probability 1−qi
(escapes with complementary probability qi). There are two rounds. If the hider is not
found (searcher looks in the wrong location) in either round, he wins and the payoff is
0: If the hider is found and captured in either round, the searcher wins and the payoff is
1: If the Hider is found but escapes in the first round, the game is played one more time
and both players remember which location the hider escaped from. If the hider escapes
in the second (final) round, he wins and the payoff is 0.
The novel feature here is that the capture probabilities must be learned over
time. At each location, the capture probability is chosen by Nature before the start of
the game, independently with probability 1/2 of being h (high) and probability 1/2 and
being l (the low probability), with h > l. In the biological scenario, this may be the gen-
eral distribution of locations in a larger region in which it is easy or hard to escape from.
A more general distribution is possible within our model, but this two point distribution
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is very easy to understand. If there is escape from location i in the first round, then in
the second round the probability that the capture probability at i is h goes down (to
some value less than 1/2). This is a type of Bayesian learning, which only takes place
after an escape, and only at the location of the escape.
Our model contributes to the realistic interaction between searching-predator
and hiding-prey acting in a possibly changing environment. Most often in nature, the
searcher has no or incomplete information during the search and pursuit interaction.
particularly in Mech, Smith, and MacNulty [53], a pack of wolves has to learn over time
the difficulty of pursuing their prey in specific terrain. Moreover, hiding-prey such as
elk seems to prefer areas with lots toppled dead trees, creating an entanglement of logs
difficult to travel through. We focus here on asking questions if learning the capture
probabilities will affect the searching and hiding behaviour. More specifically, suppose
an elk manages to escape through the deep forest, should it stay there where he believes
the capture probability is low enough, or hide at a different location?
3.4.1 Normal form of the two-period learning game
We use the normal form approach, rather than a repeated game approach. A strategy
for either player says where he will search/hide in the two periods (assuming the game
goes to the second period). Due to the symmetry of the two locations, both players
cannot but choose their first period search or hide locations randomly. Thus the players
have two strategies: rs (random,same) and rd (random,different). If there is a successful
escape from that location, they can either locate in the same location (strategy rs) or the
other location (strategy rd). This gives a simple two by two matrix game. In this sub-
section we calculate its normal form; in the next subsection we present the game solution.
First we compute the payoff for the strategy pair (rs, rs): Half the time both
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players (searcher and hider) go to different locations in first period, in which case the
hider wins and the payoff is 0. So we ignore this, put in a factor of (1/2), and assume
they go to the same location in the first period. There is only one location to consider,
suppose it has escape probability x. Then, as they both go back to this location in the
second period if the hider escapes in the first period, the expected payoff is given by
Px(rs, rs) = (1/2) ((1− x)1 + x(1− x)). (3.1)
Since x takes values l and h equiprobably we have
P (rs, rs) =
Ph(rs, rs) + Pl(rs, rs)
2
=
2− h2 − l2
4
. (3.2)
It is worth noting two special cases: If both escape probabilities are 1 (escape is certain),
then the hider always wins and the payoff is 0. If both escape probabilities are 0 then the
searcher wins if and only if they both choose the same location, which has probability
1/2.
Next we consider the strategy pair (rd, rd). Here we can assume they both go
to location 1 in the first period (hence we add the factor of 1/2) and location 2 in the
second period. The escape probabilities at these ordered locations 1 and 2 can be any of
the following: hh, ll, hl, lh. The first two are straightforward as it is the same as going
to the same location twice (already calculated in (3.2)). We list the calculation of the
four ordered hiding locations below, where Px is given in (3.1).
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Phh(rd, rd) = Ph(rs, rs)
Pll(rd, rd) = Pl(rs, rs)
Plh(rd, rd) = (1/2)((1− l)1 + l(1− h))
Phl(rd, rd) = (1/2)((1− h)1 + h(1− l))
Taking the average of these four values gives,
P (rd, rd) =






Now consider the strategy pair (rs, rd). If they go to different locations in the first
period, the game ends with payoff 0. So again, we put in factor of 1/2 and assume they
go to same location in first period. This means that if an escape happens in the first
period, the hider wins (payoff 0) in the second period. So the probability the searcher
wins is
P (rs, rd) = P (rd, rs) = (1/2)
(






Thus, we have completed the necessary calculations and the game matrix for for the
strategy pairs rs and rd, with searcher as the maximizer.
To solve this game, we begin with the game matrix as follows;
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A = A(l, h) =
 P (rs, rs) P (rs, rd)









Then we take out the fraction 1/8 to the left hand side of the equation, and we
have
8A =
−2h2 − 2l2 + 4 4− 2h− 2l
4− 2h− 2l 4− (h+ l)2

At this point we try to make the right-hand side of the equation to be a diagonal
matrix so we can easily compute it. Therefore we can write the equation as follow
8A− (4− 2h− 2l)
1 1
1 1
 = Y =
−2h2 + 2h− 2l2 + 2l 0
0 2h+ 2l − (h+ l)2
 .
Note that V (A) is the value of the matrix A. From the equation above, it shows
that the right-hand side of the equation is a diagonal matrix, and a simple formula for






 = 1/ (1/a+ 1/b) .
Using the above formula, we have
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It is also important to note that in a diagonal game, players adopt each strategy
with a probability inversely proportional to its diagonal element. To obtain this we first
calculate the value of V (Y ) given above. Then, both the searcher and hider should
choose rs and rd with probabilities V (Y )/a and V (Y )/b respectively.
We can now see that, as expected, a successful escape from a location makes that
location more attractive to the hider as a future hiding place. This is confirmed in the
following.
Proposition 7. In the learning game when l < h, after a successful escape both players
should go back to the same location with probability greater than 1/2.
Proof. Let a and b denote, as above, the diagonal elements of Y. We have
a− b =
(




2h+ 2l − (h+ l)2
)
= − (h− l)2 < 0.
This means that b > a and V/a > V/b. Hence by observation (3.5) the strategy rs should
be played with a higher probability (V/a) than rd (probability V/b), in particular with
probability more than 1/2. 
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3.4.2 An example with l = 1/3 and h = 2/3
A simple example is when the low escape probability is l = 1/3 and the high escape








with value V = V (1/3, 2/3) = 21/68, and where each of the player optimally plays rs
with probability 9/17 and rd with probability 8/17.
Suppose there is an escape in the first period at say location 1. Then in the
second period the hider goes to location 1 with probability 9/17. Since the subjective
probability of capture at location 2, from the point of view of either player, remains
unchanged at (1/3 + 2/3) /2 = 1/2; this corresponds to a certain probability x at




We then have that
(9/17)x = (8/17)(1/2) or,
x = 4/9.
This corresponds to the probability of escape probability l = 1/3 of q, where
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q1/3 + (1− q)2/3 = 4/9 or,
q = 2/3.
Thus, based on the escape at location 1 in the first period, the probability that
the escape probability there is 1/3 has gone up from the initial value of 1/2 to the higher
value of 2/3.
3.5 Conclusion
The breakthrough paper of Gal and Casas [36] gave us a model in which both the search
and pursuit elements of predator-prey interactions could be modeled together in a single
game. In that paper the capture probabilities depended on the hiding location but the
time required to search a location was assumed to be constant. In the first part of this
paper, we drop that simplifying assumption. We first consider a particular scenario where
we order the locations such that the search times increase while the capture probabilities
decrease. We solve this game for the case of a particular total search time of the searcher.
We then consider a scenario where there are many hiding locations but they come in
only two types. Locations of each type are identical in that they have the same search
times and the same capture probabilities. We solve the resulting search-pursuit game.
In the second part of the paper we deal with the question of how the players
(searcher-predator and hider-prey) learn the capture probabilities of the different loca-
tions over time. We adopt a simple Bayesian approach. After a successful escape from
a given location, both players update their subjective probabilities that it is a location
with low or high capture probability; the probability that it is low obviously increases.
In the game formulation, the players incorporate into their plan the knowledge that if
there is an escape, then that location becomes more favorable to the hider in the next
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period.
The search-hide and pursuit-evasion game is quite difficult and finding a solution
for the most general case is quite challenging. Most probably, it is a good idea for the
next step to solve for a more specific question in the problem.
We consider a possible extension to Proposition 6 by analysing larger k. Consider
the example a = b = 1; t1 = 1; t2 = 3; k = 4; and say p < q (p1 < p2 as in Gal- Casas
[36]). The Searcher inspects both cells (one of each type), so he certainly finds the Hider.
He captures him with probability p if the hider is at location 1, and q if at location type
2. So the Hider should hide at location of type 2 as it has lower capture probability.
The main question will be: How big does k have to be for this to occur? And are there
only two solution types ? We conjecture that, as in Gal-Casas, there is a critical value
of k = k̂ such that for k < k̂, Proposition 6 applies, and for k ≥ k̂ the Hider locates in a
cell of the type with the lower capture probability.
The game with learning model has also been analysed using dynamic form in
[12]. This allows more effective analysis for more than two locations and two periods.
Moreover, we believe the next avenue of research is to consider the non-zero-sum game.
Indeed, one may argue that a game between a predator and a prey may not necessarily
be a zero-sum game, as the predator is hunting its dinner while the prey is running for
survival. This is an important if challenging aspect to deal with for future studies.
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Chapter 4
Optimizing Voting Order on
Sequential Juries: A Sealed Card
Model
4.1 Introduction
Jury voting between equiprobable binary alternatives was first studied by Condorcet
[29]. In his model, each of an odd number of n jurors receives an independent signal
as to which alternative holds (say, “innocent” or “guilty”), and they vote according to
their signal. The signals are only correct with a common probability p > 1/2. The
so-called Condorcet Jury Theorem says that the reliability (i.e., the probability that the
majority verdict is correct) goes to 1 as n goes to infinity. Condorcet’s analysis has
been extended in many directions. The direction that concerns us here is to make the
voting sequential, so that when a juror votes he is aware of all previous votes. With
sequential voting, another issue appears. If the jurors have different “abilities” (say
different values of p in the Condorcet model), which voting order is most likely to give
the correct majority verdict (has the highest reliability)? Alpern and Chen [2] introduced
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a numerical model in which abilities are indicated by a discrete set of five equally spaced
abilities {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and where signals lie in the interval [−9,−7, . . . , 7, 9], with the
extremes giving maximum probability for each alternative. In that model, they found
that given a jury of three fixed abilities, the optimal voting order is as follows: the juror
of middle ability votes first, then the juror of the highest ability, followed by the juror
of the lowest ability. For any jury of three, and any notion of ability, we shall call this
the Alpern-Chen ordering.
In Alpern and Chen [2] the notion of ability was abstract and defined as a pa-
rameter in the signal distribution. Here we have a more concrete notion of ability — it
is an integer giving the number of cards a juror is allowed to sample in order to guess
the colour of the sealed card. It is the main motivation of the present paper to give an
appealing concrete example of the notion of ability. Specifically, the model is as follows.
A card is removed (“sealed”) unseen from a deck of size D = 2m, half red (R) and half
black (B). The colour of the sealed card is the state of Nature (N), which the jurors
attempt to guess in their vote. Each juror is allowed to view a sample of cards, where
the sample size is his ability. He also has access to the information about the votes
of jurors voting earlier together with their “abilities” (i.e., sample sizes). Each juror is
constrained to vote for the alternative (R or B) that is more likely, conditioned on his
private information (the number of red cards in his sample) and the prior voting. Given
a set of jurors of known abilities, in which order should we let them vote to maximize
the probability that the majority verdict is correct?
More generally, the main aim of this paper is to compare the efficacy of the six
voting orders for a jury of three abilities a < b < c. We do this for various deck sizes
D. We consider three criteria: The first is the reliability, which depends on the voting
order and the three abilities and gives the probability that the majority verdict of such
a jury is correct. The second is the optimality fraction of a voting order, which is the
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fraction of all ability sets for which it has the highest reliability. The third criteria is
the average reliability of a voting order, which averages the reliabilities over all possible
sets of abilities. We observe that if for some deck size D a certain voting order (say
the Alpern-Chen order) has the highest reliability for every ability set, then it also has
the highest average reliability and has an optimality fraction of 1. This will be more
formally defined in Section 4.3.
To conclude this section, we give the reader an illustrative example showing the
importance of voting order on the reliability of the majority verdict.
Example 1. Suppose the original deck has D = 4 cards, two red and two black. Suppose
there are three jurors, and juror i = 1, 2, 3 can sample i cards. Note that juror 3 will
know the color of the sealed card, so if he votes first or second the later voting jurors
will copy him to produce an accurate majority verdict with reliability 1. So we need
only consider the two orderings where juror 3 votes last. It is easiest to calculate the
probability that the verdict is wrong. We may assume that the sealed card N is R, by
symmetry. We calculate the probability of initial voting BB : First consider the voting
order (1, 2, 3). Juror 1 votes B if he draws a red card, which has probability 1/3. The
only case where juror 2 will not copy is if he draws two black cards, which has probability
1/3. So the probability of BB is (1/3)(2/3) = 2/9; and the reliability is 1− 2/9 = 7/9.
Next, consider the voting order (2, 1, 3). Juror 1 will vote red unless he picks a red and
black, in which case he randomizes. So he votes B with probability (2/3)(1/2) = 1/3. If
juror 2 draws a red, he also votes B. If he draws a black, he votes R. The probability
he draws a red is 1/3. so the probability of BB is (1/3)(1/3) = 1/9 and hence the
reliability of jury (2, 1, 3) is 1− 1/9 = 8/9.
Thus we have shown the reliability is 1 if juror 3 votes last, is 7/9 for the voting order
(1, 2, 3) and is 8/9 for (2, 1, 3).
Example 1 shows the importance of voting order. Note in particular that the
Alpern-Chen order (2, 3, 1) is among the optimal orderings. The difficulty in obtaining
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this type of result on optimal voting order was highlighted in the well-known paper on
sequential juries of Dekel and Piccione [31]. We also note that our model is distinct from
that of Alpern-Chen, so it was not clear from the beginning that their optimal ordering
would also be optimal in our model. Indeed for some juries it is not. For example when
D = 6 with three red and three black, and abilities i = 1, 2, 3. We found that voting
order (1, 3, 2) is the unique optimal ordering. However, the fact that we get the same
optimal ordering in a different probability model suggests that the Alpern-Chen ordering
could heuristically be utilised by decision-maker to achieve a reliable final decision via
sequential voting.
Summary of the main results
The main results of this paper are propositions based on computations from a finite
number of cases with Mathematica and MatLab, and are reported in Sections 4.4 – 4.6.
Most of these results are quantitative in nature, for example, we give precise probability
of the three jurors reaching the correct verdict given the deck size, their ability, and the
voting order. However, we believe that it is useful to give rough summary of some of
these results here. For the precise results on which these summaries are based, please
refer to the specific propositions quoted.
1. For small decks (of size D ≤ 16): The Alpern-Chen ordering maximizes the
reliability of the majority verdict for any jury with even abilities. The seniority
ordering (highest, middle, lowest) has higher reliability than the anti-seniority
ordering (lowest, middle, highest). Whichever juror votes first, the reliability is
higher when the next two jurors vote in decreasing order of ability. See Propositions
8, 9, and 10.
2. For medium size decks (D ≤ 52): For each D, the Alpern-Chen ordering is best
for more juries than any other ordering (Proposition 11). For each D, the average
reliability of the Alpern-Chen ordering, taken over all juries, is higher than for any
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other ordering (Proposition 12).
3. Comparison of the reliability of sequential scheme (in the Alpern-Chen
order) with the more familiar simultaneous voting scheme: For a very
large jury, sequential voting eventually herds, so that unlike the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, the reliability does not tend to 1. We give a comparative analytical argu-
ment (Theorem 9) that simultaneous voting has higher reliability than sequential
for the homogeneous jury with common ability 1 and D ≥ 4, while this is reversed
for common ability 2 and D = 4. We show that in general sequential voting is
better than simultaneous in terms of average reliability (Proposition 14) and in
terms of the fraction of juries for which it is better (Proposition 15). We then ask
the question of when (even if rarely) simultaneous voting is better. The answer is
for relatively homogeneous juries (ones with low variability of ability).
4. For a larger jury of size 5: We check to what extent our main results of juries
of size 3 carry over. We find that when D is between 12 and 30, the five voting
orders of highest reliability (out of 120 possible orderings) all have the most able
juror votes in the middle of the order (as in the Alpern-Chen ordering). We find
other analogies as well.
4.2 Related literature
The founding paper of this literature is Condorcet [29]. The two directions in which
we travel from that source are heterogeneous jurors (differing abilities) and, more im-
portantly, sequential voting. Heterogeneous jurors, in the sense of differing correctness
probabilities p in the Condorcet sense, have been considered in many papers, notably
Hoeffding [40], Boland [22] and Kanazawa [44]. Sequential voting has been much less
studied. Two significant papers in this direction are Dekel and Piccione [31], which com-
pares simultaneous and sequential equilibria, and Ottaviani and Sørensen [57], which
considers honest voters concerned with their reputations.
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Dekel and Piccione [31] discuss the comparison between simultaneous and sequen-
tial voting mechanisms. They show that the symmetric equilibria in the simultaneous
voting game are also equilibria of the sequential voting. Moreover, they examine some
instances where information aggregation in sequential voting game does no better than
one found in the simultaneous scheme. Our finding provides an interesting contrast to
this finding as we find in the sealed card problem that sequential voting most often
results in a better voting decision compared to the simultaneous voting mechanism.
Ottaviani and Sørensen [57] consider a jury of heterogeneous experts who care
only about their own vote being correct, to enhance their future reputation. They keep
the assumption of binary signals. They also emphasize the importance of group thinking
and herding behaviour.
The paper that introduces a model concerned with the optimal ordering of voters
with heterogeneous abilities is Alpern and Chen [2]. Each of three jurors receives a
signal (private information) in the interval [−9,−7, . . . , 7, 9]. The distribution of the
signal depends on the binary state of Nature and the ability of the juror. From the
signal and previous votes, the juror determines the probability of the two states of
Nature and votes for the more likely one. The middle-high-low ordering is shown to be
optimal in terms of the reliability of the majority verdict. That paper also considered
strategic voting, where jurors can use voting rules that maximize the reliability of the
group verdict, rather than the probability that their own vote is correct. We will not
consider strategic voting in this paper.
In the situation where the hierarchy or the experience of the jurors has high
variability, conventional wisdom holds that the voting order follows the seniority rule of
decreasing ability order [43], as for most of the cases in the US Supreme Court. Moreover,
when the case is uncertain, or a tie occurs in a vote, then the most senior judge should
cast the casting vote. This seniority rule is in an interesting contrast to the work of
Alpern and Chen [3] which establishes that voting achieves the highest reliability when
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the casting vote is allocated to the juror with median ability.
Another relevant paper is by Kanazawa [44]. He shows that as long as the mean
of individual competence is high, then heterogeneous groups are better at making the
correct decision than homogeneous groups for any given level of mean competence. The
significance of voting order in a committee version of the Secretary Problem is analyzed
by Alpern, Gal and Solan [13] and Alpern and Baston [1] in a model that allows vetoes.
4.3 The Sealed Card Voting Model
In this section, we formally model the sealed card problem. The parameters of the model
are the size n of the jury, taken as odd so that a majority always exists, and the size
D = 2m of the deck of cards, m are red (R) and m are black (B). Also, the ability
ai ∈ {1, . . . , D − 1} of each juror i is known. The model is dynamic: the first step is
a random selection of a card, which is removed unseen (sealed) from the deck. The
colour of the sealed card, R or B, is the state of Nature (N ∈ {R,B}) that the jurors
will attempt to guess correctly. Then each juror who votes in position i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
allowed to see ai cards drawn randomly from the remaining deck of D − 1 cards, which
we will call card pool from now on. We refer back to Example 1 and assume that the
sealed card is red. Having said so, we know there are m− 1 red cards and m black cards
in the card pool. In general, given a juror of ability a, we can write the probability of
randomly drawing x red cards out of a total m− 1 red cards in the card pool as follows:











Based on the number of red and black cards in his sample, and the prior voting,
juror i uses Bayes’ Law to decide the most likely state of Nature. If R and B are equally
likely, the juror votes randomly. He then votes this way (R or B) and returns his sample
to the card pool. After the last juror votes, the verdict of the jury is the majority
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colour, denoted by V , in the odd voting sequence. We (or the organizer of the jury)
wish to compare the voting order of the jurors of given abilities in order to maximize
the probability (which we called the reliability) that the verdict V ∈ {R,B} is correct.
For example, if n = 3 and the abilities are distinct, say 1, 2, 3 there are 3! = 6 ability
orders to consider. For a fixed set of abilities (like {1, 2, 3} in Example 1), each voting
order has a reliability that can be calculated and compared to the others.
Figure 4.1: The two states of Nature, N = B (left), N = R (right), D = 6
Consider for example a deck of D = 6 cards, with the two states of Nature
illustrated in Figure 4.1. If juror i = 1 with ability a1 = 1 draws a red card, he knows
he is more likely in State B and consequently votes B. Suppose juror i = 2 with ability
a2 = 4 draws a sample of two red and two black cards. From his private information
alone, he views the two states as equiprobable and, if voting first, would vote randomly.
However, if he knows that the first juror voted B with ability of a1 = 1, this increases
the conditional probability that Nature is B to above one half, he would vote B as well.
This is a type of herding. Of course, if the second juror drew three black cards, he would
vote R.
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Voting behaviour. We assume that every juror votes honestly for the alternative, R
or B, that he views as more likely, given prior voting with knowledge of prior abilities
and the cards he draws. If considering our model as a game, this would mean each juror
gets a payoff of 1 if his vote turns out to be correct and 0 otherwise. He does not care
about the correctness of the verdict. This type of honest voting would likely prevail if
the juror is rewarded, perhaps in improving their reputation, if his vote (rather than the
majority verdict) turns out to be correct. If after sampling he still views the state of
Nature as equally likely, then he randomizes his vote.
Abilities. Denote by Λ = {1, 2, . . . , D− 1} the set of juror abilities, where D− 1 is the
size of the card pool. Saying that a juror has ability a means that when he comes to
vote, he samples a cards from the card pool. An ability set A ⊆ Λ is a set of n distinct
abilities, considered as an unordered jury. Thus the set An of all unordered juries of size
n is as follows:
An = {A ⊆ Λ : |A| = n},
where we use |A| to denote the cardinality of set A. We list the abilities of an unordered
jury in increasing order for convenience, such as A = {4, 5, 6}. Let Πn denote the set of
all n! rank orderings (permutations) of {1, . . . , n}. A jury J of size n is an ordered set of
n distinct abilities. Let Jn denotes the set of all juries of size n. There is a natural way
to apply an ordering r ∈ Πn to an ability set A ∈ An to obtain a jury J . For example,
if n = 3, r = (2, 1, 3) and A = {5, 7, 9}, then we can write r(A) = (7, 5, 9). This means
the ordered jury (7, 5, 9) has the first juror of ability 7 votes first, followed by the second
juror of ability 5, and the last juror to vote is the one with ability 9. In other words,
the elements of the set A are written in the rank order of r. Thus we can think of each
rank order r as a mapping of ability sets into juries, r : An → Jn.
Reliabilities and other measures. For every jury J ∈ Jn, we define its reliability
Q(J) ∈ [0, 1] as the probability the jury gets the verdict correctly, that is, the majority
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verdict V is the same as the colour N of the sealed card. . The reason for the reliability
in probabilistic form is the stochastic nature of the sampling. Thus, Q : Jn → [0, 1] is
a mapping from juries to probabilities. The problem we address is how to optimize the
voting order given an ability set.
For every rank ordering r∗ ∈ Πn, we define its optimality fraction φ(r∗) as the
fraction of ability sets A ∈ An for which it gives the highest reliability, that is, for which
Q(r∗(A)) ≥ Q(r(A)) for all r ∈ Πn. Note that this function φ is dependent upon the
deck size. More precisely,
φ(r∗) =
|{A ∈ An : Q(r∗(A)) ≥ Q(r(A)) for all r ∈ Πn}|
|An|
. (4.2)
For r ∈ Πn, we also define its average reliability Q̄(r) as a measure of how reliable this
voting order is for a random set of abilities. More precisely, Q̄(r) is the average value of
Q(r(A)) for ability sets A ∈ An. Thus, Q̄ : Πn → [0, 1] is a mapping from rank orderings
to probabilities.
In the remainder of this section, we describe specifically the process of private
information amalgamation. We begin in Section 4.3.1 by discussing the public bias θ,
voting threshold, and the existence of herding. Then in Section 4.3.2, we present the
formula for calculating the reliability.
4.3.1 Public bias, voting threshold and herding
When a juror comes to vote, before he looks at his sample of cards, there is a probability
θ, conditional on prior voting, that the sealed card is red. We call this probability
the public bias. We call it public because it is conditioned only on public information
(voting) and not private information (cards drawn). For the first juror, the public bias is
given by θ = 1/2, or θ1 = 1/2 to indicate it is the public bias of the first juror. It is 1/2
because as the original deck has the same number of red and black cards, the randomly
chosen sealed card has probability one half of being red. If juror i votes R, the bias θi+1
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goes up (from θi) for the next juror i+ 1; if he votes B, it goes down. The change from
θi to θi+1 does not depend directly on the cards drawn by juror i, as this is not known
by juror i+ 1. The precise way in which θ changes after a vote is determined by Bayes’
Law. We note that the public bias θi+1 could be calculated by anyone (not necessarily
a juror) who knows the abilities of the first i jurors and how they voted.
Next, suppose a juror of ability a comes to vote when the public bias is θ. De-
pending on the number x of red cards in his sample of a cards, the probability of N = R
(sealed card red) is either > 1/2, < 1/2 or in rare cases = 1/2. His corresponding vote
will be to vote B, R, or randomize equiprobably. Before looking at his sample of cards
he can compute a threshold τ such that if x > τ the probability of B is > 1/2; if x < τ
the probability of B is < 1/2; if x = τ the probability of B is 1/2. His corresponding
votes will be B, R, or randomize. Note that say τ = 3.1 and τ = 3.2 are equivalent
thresholds in that they produce the same votes. For convenience we can take τ = 3.5 in
such cases for uniqueness.
So generally τ = (k+1)/2 for some non-negative integer k. However, if say x = 4
results in equiprobable R and B, and thus randomized voting, we say that τ = 4. If
τ = a+1/2, with a denoting his ability, the juror will certainly vote R because he cannot
have x more than a In such a case (τ > a) we say that there is herding – the juror can
vote without even looking at his cards. Similarly if τ < 0, the juror certainly votes B. In
our model, herding may be temporary: one juror might herd while the next juror (with
a higher ability) might not. If we allowed jurors with a = 0 ability, they would always
herd. In general, herding is less likely with jurors of higher ability. If the jurors vote
in seniority order (decreasing order of ability) then once one juror herds, all subsequent
jurors also herd.
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4.3.2 Calculation of reliabilities
In this section, we derive formulas for reliability of a jury of size n = 3. Suppose Nature
is in state R. Then the three voting sequences (R,R, any), (R,B,R) and (B,R,R) lead
to a correct verdict. Note that if the first two jurors vote for the same colour, the ver-
dict has already been generated by majority rule, no matter which colour the third juror
votes. Similarly, the three voting sequences (B,B, any), (B,R,B) and (R,B,B) lead to
the correct verdict if N = B. Having stated this, we ask the simple question: Given
a deck of size D = 2m (≤ 52) and three jurors of abilities a, b, c, in what order should
the three jurors vote to amalgamate their private information best and so produce the
highest voting reliability?
We will show that the reliability is maximized when the three jurors vote in
Alpern-Chen ordering, under two kinds of measurement: optimality fraction and average
reliability. For every jury J = (a, b, c) of public bias of θ, the reliability Q(J) is calculated
as follows:
Q(a, b, c) = θ1(Pr[RR ] + Pr[RBR] + Pr[BRR])
+ (1− θ1)(Pr[BB ] + Pr[BRB] + Pr[RBB]).
The equation above computes the probability that the majority verdict is R when
N = R or the probability that the majority verdict is B when N = B. For example,
Pr[RR ] is the probability of the first and the second juror both votes Red. Note that
the third voter in Pr[RR ] is blank because the majority vote is already decided when
the first two jurors voted R. In the beginning of Section 4.3.1 we stated that θ1 = 1/2
because the original deck has the same number of red and black cards. This also means
that the states N = R and N = B are symmetric. Therefore, the equation above can
be updated as follows:
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Q(a, b, c) = 1/2 (Pr[RR ] + Pr[RBR] + Pr[BRR])
+ 1/2 (Pr[BB ] + Pr[BRB] + Pr[RBB]).
= (Pr[RR ] + Pr[RBR] + Pr[BRR]). (4.3)
To compute the reliability (4.3) above, we use the hypergeometric probability
represented in (4.1) and its cumulative distribution function (CDF).













Suppose the sealed card is red (i.e., N = R) so there are m − 1 red cards and m
black cards in the card pool. The equation (4.4) computes the probability of drawing
up to Y red cards from the possible m − 1 red cards in the card pool in a drawings
without replacement from a deck of 2m− 1. The probability of Y ≤ τ is the cumulative
distribution. Then for a jury J = (a, b, c), the probabilities of voting sequences in (4.3)
are now calculated in the following formulae, where τ(σ) denotes the threshold of juror
who has the prior voting sequence σ:
Pr[RR ] = Pr[Y ≤ τ | a] Pr[Y ≤ τ(R) | b],
Pr[RBR] = Pr[Y ≤ τ | a] (1− Pr[Y ≤ τ(R) | b]) Pr[Y ≤ τ(RB) | c],
Pr[BRR] = (1− Pr[Y ≤ τ | a]) Pr[Y ≤ τ(B) | b] Pr[Y ≤ τ(BR) | c].
To check this, let us refer back to Example 1 and calculate Q(1, 2, 3) using the
formulae above. We know that the first juror with ability a = 1 will vote R if he draws
0 red card, thus Pr[Y ≤ 0 | 1] = 2/3. If juror 1 voted R, juror 2 with ability b = 2 will
vote R with Pr[Y ≤ 1 | 2] = 1 and vote B with probability 0. However if juror 1 voted
B, juror 2 will vote R with probability 1/3. Juror 3 with ability c = 3 will always vote R
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because his ability is equal to the card pool, so he is able to draw all the cards. Hence,
Q(1, 2, 3) = (Pr[RR ]+Pr[RBR]+Pr[BRR]) = 2/3∗1+2/3∗0∗1+1/3∗1/3∗1 = 7/9.
This result is the same as the one we calculated in Example 1.
4.4 Optimal Voting Orders For n = 3
We are now ready to present our findings on optimal voting order for a jury of size
three. We begin in Section 4.4.1 by studying a smaller deck and limiting each juror to
even-only ability. In Section 4.4.2, we present our result on the optimality fractions φ.
Section 4.4.3 considers optimal voting orderings in terms of the average reliability Q̄.
Apart from Section 4.4.1, the rest of our paper analyses the normal 52-card deck and all
ability (odd and even) sets.
4.4.1 On reliability for small decks
In this subsection, we show that when the deck size D satisfies D ≤ 16 and all jurors have
even abilities, then the Alpern-Chen ordering results in highest reliability. We have also
tested this with odd ability and arbitrary (both odd and even) ability in which we did
not obtain a clear result with respect to reliability. We suspect that there are two reasons
for this. First, note that if the first juror has even ability, this allows for ties (the state
of Nature is still equally likely even after sampling), for which the juror randomizes
his vote. The resulting random voting tends to smooth out certain elements of the
reliability function and gives more consistent patterns of optimal reliability. Secondly,
when all jurors have odd ability, then this allows for complete information regarding the
true State of Nature. As an example, for deck size D = 8, and we have an odd-only
ability set {3, 5, 7}, whenever a juror of ability 7 votes first or second, the reliability will
be equal to 1. We are not able to see a clear “ranking” of the voting orderings in terms
of reliability as opposed to even-only ability sets. The computed data establishing these
propositions is given in Table 4.6 in the Appendix.
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Proposition 8. For a three-member jury of even-only abilities and deck size D ≤ 16,
the Alpern-Chen ordering (median-high-low) gives the strictly highest reliability.
Many discussions in the literature of optimal voting orders compare only seniority
and anti-seniority ordering. For small decks we can give a definitive answer as to which
is better.
Proposition 9. For three-member jury of even-only abilities and deck size D ≤ 16,
the seniority ordering (c, b, a) has the higher reliability than the anti-seniority ordering
(a, b, c), where a < b < c.
Proposition 10. For deck size D ≤ 16 and a three member jury of even abilities x, a, b
with a < b, the ordering (x, b, a) has a higher reliability than (x, a, b). That is, it is
always better for the last to jurors to vote in decreasing order of ability.
Note that Proposition 10 is applicable in the situation where the first voter is
already pre-determined, such as most often in a company, the moderator (not necessarily
of highest ability) gets to voice the initial opinion. Then the lower ability between the
remaining two should always vote last. The readers are encouraged to see Table 4.6 in
the Appendix for our computational ‘proof’ of Proposition 8, 9, and 10.
4.4.2 On optimality fraction
In this subsection we calculate the optimality fraction for the six orderings of a three-
member jury. Recall that this is the fraction of the potential ability sets for which the
ordering gives the highest reliability. In most of our discussion below, we use the case
of D = 6 for explanatory reason. Then we give a result (Proposition 11) that holds for
D ≤ 52.
Table 4.1 summarizes our findings about the performance of different voting or-





D = 6 8 . . . 26 . . . 52
(a, b, c) 0/10=0.0 0.029 . . . 0.006 . . . 0.007
(a, c, b) 8/10=0.8 0.620 . . . 0.298 . . . 0.200
(b, a, c) 0/10=0.0 0.000 . . . 0.000 . . . 0.000
(b, c, a) 9/10=0.9 0.800 . . . 0.652 . . . 0.630
(c, a, b) 6/10=0.6 0.429 . . . 0.167 . . . 0.148
(c, b, a) 6/10=0.6 0.486 . . . 0.305 . . . 0.253
Sum 2.9 2.371 . . . 1.427 . . . 1.238
Table 4.1: Optimality fraction φ for deck size up to 52, (a < b < c)
fuller results the reader is referred to Table 4.7 in the Appendix). To get a small taste of
our findings, observe Table 4.2, which corresponds to the case of deck size D = 6. Note





= 10 ability sets:
A3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}}.
Of these ten ability sets, the Alpern-Chen ordering (b, c, a) has the highest reliability
on nine of the ten ability sets. Table 4.2 describes how the entries for the column
D = 6 in Table 4.1 have been calculated. For each ordering (column), one checks the
rows (ability sets) for which that ordering is optimal. The bottom row gives the frac-
tion of the ten ability sets for which the ordering is optimal, which is what we call its
optimality fraction. This fraction may sum to more than one due to ties in reliability.
Note that in all cases the Alpern-Chen ordering (b, c, a) gives the highest in each column.
From Table 4.1, we can also see that the optimality fraction φ decreases monoton-
ically as the deck size increases. This is due to an increasing gap between lower ability
and higher ability within a jury given the increasing size of the deck. there are more
instances where a juror herds in larger deck sizes, reducing the optimality fraction of the
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sub-optimal voting orderings. In Table 4.7, it can be seen that the optimality fraction for
each voting orderings keeps on decreasing until it eventually fluctuates around a stable
value. For instance, the voting ordering (a, b, c) fluctuates around 0.006 and 0.007 for
deck size 24 ≤ D ≤ 52. Another interesting observation is that the sum of φ gets closer
to 1 as the deck size increases. However, as the deck size keeps on increasing beyond
52, we conjecture that this value will not converge to 1 because we still consider ability
sets {a, b,D − 1} which cause 4 out of 6 voting ordering (highest ability votes first or
second) to always be optimal. As the deck size increases, there are more of such ability
sets. Therefore there will always be ties in reliability and the percentage of overlap is
proportional to the deck size.
Ability sets
Orderings
(a, b, c) (a, c, b) (b, a, c) (b, c, a) (c, a, b) (c, b, a)
{1,2,3} 0 X 0 0 0 0
{1,2,4} 0 X 0 X 0 0
{1,2,5} 0 X 0 X X X
{1,3,4} 0 0 0 X 0 0
{1,3,5} 0 X 0 X X X
{1,4,5} 0 X 0 X X X
{2,3,4} 0 0 0 X 0 0
{2,3,5} 0 X 0 X X X
{2,4,5} 0 X 0 X X X
{3,4,5} 0 X 0 X X X
Counts 0 8 0 9 6 6
Fraction 0 0.8 0 0.9 0.6 0.6
Table 4.2: Optimality fraction for deck size D = 6, (a < b < c)
Furthermore, we use Figure 4.2 to compare the optimality fractions for all deck
sizes, where the vertical axis gives the optimality fraction and the horizontal axis gives
the deck size. The legend on the right side of the graph sorts the voting orders from
the highest to the lowest. Note that we show D a multiple of 4 on the x-axis for better
display of the figure. The reader can refer to Table 4.7 in the Appendix to check that
79
the result is consistent across any D ≤ 52.
Figure 4.2: Optimality fractions of the six voting orderings
It is shown in Figure 4.2 that the Alpern-Chen voting order is always the highest
after deck size 4. When the deck size is near 52, we can see a prevalent ranking on the
six voting orderings. The seniority ordering (c, b, a) is the second highest. Meanwhile
(b, a, c) line is at exact height of 0, which means that it is never optimal.
Proposition 11. Given any deck of size D ≤ 52, the Alpern-Chen ordering (b, c, a) has
the highest optimality fraction. Furthermore, ordering (b, a, c) is never optimal.
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4.4.3 On average reliability
For each deck size D ≤ 52, we calculate the average reliability Q̄ for the six voting orders
r. The average is taken over all ability sets for D. The results are drawn in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Average reliability of the six voting orderings
In Figure 4.3, the legend on the right side shows the six ability orders sorted
from the highest average reliability to the lowest. It can be seen that for 8 ≤ D ≤ 52
the ordering of the six voting orders stays the same. The Alpern Chen ordering is again
always the highest in terms of the average reliability Q̄. The second highest is (a, c, b)
followed by the seniority ordering (c, b, a). For use in Section 4.5, we have added the
average reliability for simultaneous voting in the dashed line. We show in Table 4.3
some simple cases to the reader. The curious reader is encouraged to check the full data





D = 4 6 . . . 26 . . . 50 52
(a, b, c) 7/9 = 0.78 0.768 . . . 0.648 . . . 0.610 0.608
(a, c, b) 1 0.901 . . . 0.703 . . . 0.651 0.648
(b, a, c) 8/9= 0.89 0.703 . . . 0.609 . . . 0.584 0.582
(b,c,a) 1 0.910 . . . 0.710 . . . 0.655 0.653
(c, a, b) 1 0.867 . . . 0.673 . . . 0.631 0.628
(c, b, a) 1 0.890 . . . 0.695 . . . 0.645 0.643
Table 4.3: Average reliabilities Q̄ for deck size up to 52
Note that when D = 4 there is only one ability set {1, 2, 3}, so the average
reliability Q̄ is the same as reliability Q for this ability set. The reliabilities for the six
orderings were calculated in Example 1. Our proposition follows easily from Table 4.3
and Figure 4.3.
Proposition 12. Given any deck of size D ≤ 52, the Alpern-Chen ordering (b, c, a) has
an average reliability larger than any other voting order. Furthermore, for 8 ≤ D ≤ 52,
the average reliability of the six voting orders is the same as indicated by the order of
the legends, namely (b, c, a) > (a, c, b) > (c, b, a) > (c, a, b) > (a, b, c) > (b, a, c).
4.5 Sequential vs. Simultaneous Voting Scheme
Up to now we have been analyzing sequential voting internally, comparing the reliabil-
ity of different sequential voting orders for a fixed set of abilities. In this section, we
analyze sequential voting externally, by comparing its reliability with the more famil-
iar simultaneous voting scheme. This is the scheme studied by [29], where each juror
votes based solely on his own private information (here, the cards he samples), without
any knowledge of the votes of other jurors. We could equally well call this independent
voting. We compare the reliability of sequential voting in the optimal (Alpern-Chen)
ordering to that of simultaneous voting. One might think that sequential voting is al-
ways superior, as jurors have more indirect information about the sealed card. It turns
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out, as we show in this section, that indeed sequential voting is generally superior, but
not always. The problem with sequential voting, especially for a large jury, is that a
high ability juror who is not an oracle (and hence sometimes gets it wrong) may unduly
influence subsequent jurors through herding, so that their information is not used at all.
To see this in a simple but large setting, suppose that there is a deck of size D,
one juror of ability 3 and all the rest (n− 1 of them) of ability 1. Suppose the juror of
ability 3 goes first in a sequential vote. He has some probability p = p3 that at least
two of the cards he draws are the other colour to the sealed card, and that he thus votes
correctly. (This is essentially his Condorcet value of p.) Then the next juror (and all
subsequent ones), who gets a signal which is correct with probability p1 < p3, will copy
the vote of the first juror and hence the majority verdict, for any jury size n, will be
correct with probability p = p3 (that is, if the first juror voted correctly). Now we know
from the Condorcet Jury Theorem (under the assumption of Owen, Grofman, and Feld
[58] that all jurors have p values of at least p1 ), that for sufficiently large jury size n,
the reliability of the verdict, which approaches to 1, will exceed that of the sequential
jury’s reliability p3. So for very large juries, the Condorcet Jury Theorem ensures that
simultaneous voting is superior to sequential voting.
Of course, juries are typically small rather than large. To compare the two voting
schemes for a three-member jury, we begin by recalling Example 1, which had a deck of
two red and two black cards, and three jurors with abilities 1, 2, and 3 voting sequen-
tially in some order. When the juror of ability 3 (called juror 3) votes first or second, his
vote (always correct) will be copied by later voting jurors to produce a correct majority
verdict, so reliability is 1. The remaining voting orders (1, 2, 3) and (2, 1, 3) were shown
in Example 1 to have reliabilities 7/9 and 8/9, respectively. In particular, sequential
voting in the optimal Alpern-Chen ordering (2, 3, 1) has reliability 1. Next consider the
reliability of simultaneous (independent) voting. By symmetry, we assume the sealed
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card is R. What is the probability that the verdict is wrong, B? Since the juror of ability
3 is an oracle who will draw two blacks and a red and give the correct vote of R, the
verdict can only be B if that is the vote of the other two. Clearly the juror of ability
1 will vote B if and only if he draws a red card, which has probability 1/3. The juror
of ability 2 will vote B if he draws one red and one black card and then randomizes
to vote B. This has probability (2/3) (1/2) = 1/3. So the reliability of simultaneous
voting in this example is 1 − (1/3)2 = 8/9. This is less than the perfect reliability 1
of sequential voting in the optimal (Alpern-Chen) ordering. (It is however better than
sequential voting in the suboptimal ability order (2, 1, 3) .)
We now give an example where the comparative reliability of the two voting
schemes can go the other way: When there are three jurors of common ability 1, si-
multaneous voting is better. To make the following proof clearer, we assume that the
jurors vote in the same order using either scheme, but only in the sequential scheme
are they told the votes of the earlier jurors. We use black and red for the color of the
cards drawn, and B and R for the votes and the verdict. For example, we might say
’the second juror draws r but votes R because he copies the first juror’. The simplest
ability set for this comparison is when the jurors have the common ability 1, they each
draw a single card from the deck. We remove our assumption of distinct abilities here to
allow for a very small number of drawn cards. Note that the following result is proved
without calculating any reliabilities, just using direct qualitative comparisons.
Theorem 9. For any deck size D ≥ 4 and ability set {1, 1, 1} , simultaneous voting has
a higher reliability than sequential voting. Furthermore, for any total private informa-
tion (draws of card for all players), simultaneous voting is at least as likely as sequential
voting to have the correct verdict (N) ; for some total private information vectors, it is
strictly more likely.
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Proof. We prove the second assertion, which implies the first. We divide the private
information vector into three cases. In the first two cases, both voting schemes give the
same verdict. In the last case, simultaneous voting always gives the verdict most likely
to be true (given all the cards drawn), while sequential voting sometimes give the verdict
which is less likely to be true.
Case 1: draws red,red, (or black,black, ). By symmetry, we can assume first two
jurors draw a red. Voting simultaneously, the first two jurors vote BB (with
verdict V = B). The same is true if the second juror sees the vote of the first
juror. So in these cases, both schemes give the same verdict.
Case 2: red,black,red (or black,red,black). By symmetry, we assume the cards
drawn by the three jurors are re, bl, re. For the simultaneous scheme, voting is
BRB and the verdict is V = B. With sequential voting, the first juror votes
B. Then the second juror (who knows one card of each color has been drawn)
randomizes and equiprobably votes R or B. In either case, the third juror votes
B. So while the voting sequence may not be the same as for simultaneous voting,
the verdict V = B is the same.
Case 3: red,black,black (or black,red,red). Again we assume red, black, black by
symmetry. Note that in this case it is more likely that the sealed card is N = R.
This more likely state of Nature R is the verdict for simultaneous voting, which
will be B,R,R. Next consider sequential voting. The first juror votes B and the
second juror randomizes between R and B. With positive probability, he votes B,
giving the sequence B,B which gives verdict V = B. So with positive probability
we get the verdict B, which is the verdict less likely to be correct. So with these
draws, the verdict of the jury voting sequentially is less likely to be correct than
the jury voting simultaneously.
This establishes the second part of the proof, as the three cases cover all possibili-
ties. The reliability of each voting scheme is the sum of the products of their conditional
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reliability (given the card draws) multiplied by the probability of these draws. Since the
probabilities are the same (and positive for all), the comparative results stated above
for conditional reliability establishes the claim about reliability in the first sentence.

For those readers preferring algebraic forms for the above proof, it can be calcu-
lated that the when p = (D/2) / (D − 1) , the number of cards of opposite color to the
sealed card divided by the size of the remaining deck, the reliability of sequential voting is
given by
(
p+ 3p2 − 2p3
)
/2 and the reliability of simultaneous voting is p3 +3p2 (1− p) .
The difference is given by
(




p3 + 3p2 (1− p)
)
= (1/2) p (2p− 1) (p− 1) ,
which is positive for 1/2 < p < 1, or equivalently D ≥ 4.
The reader might now think that for perfectly homogeneous juries (k, k, k), si-
multaneous voting always has a higher reliability than sequential voting. The following
example shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 13. Suppose we have a deck of D = 4 cards (two red, two black) and three
jurors of common ability 2. Then sequential voting has a higher reliability (21/27) than
simultaneous voting (20/27).
Proof. First consider sequential voting. If the first two votes are the same, say Y, then
that is the majority verdict. Suppose first two votes are distinct, call them X,Y. The
first vote X might come from a tie, but if the second voter gets a tie, he copies and votes
X. So the vote of Y of juror 2 is certainly correct, as two cards of the same color imply
the sealed card is the opposite color (Y ). It follows that the third juror will also vote
Y. Thus verdict depends on first two votes only, actually it is equal to the vote of the
second juror. So the only way sequential voting gives the wrong verdict (say R when the
sealed card is N = B) is when the first two jurors both draw one card of each color and
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the first juror randomizes incorrectly to vote R. The probability of drawing one card of
each color is 2/3, so the probability of an incorrect verdict is (2/3)2 (1/2) = 2/9, so the
reliability of sequential voting is 1− 2/9 = 7/9 = 20/27.
Next consider simultaneous (independent) voting. The only way a juror can vote
incorrectly is if she draws one card of each color and then randomizes the wrong way.
This has probability q = (2/3) (1/2) = 1/3, so p = 2/3. Condorcet voting with p = 2/3
has reliability p3 + 3p2q = 20/27, the probability that two or three jurors get the correct
signal (opposite color to sealed card).

So we have seen that the Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that for large juries,
where the reliability of simultaneous juries goes to one, herding may lead to a limit-
ing reliability of sequential voting which is less than one. For juries of size three, we
have shown the ability set {1, 2, 3} of Example 1 has sequential reliability (in the opti-
mal Alpern-Chen ordering) higher than simultaneous. For perfectly homogeneous juries
{k, k, k}, the inequality of reliabilities can go either way: simultaneous better for k = 1
but sequential better for k = 2.
In the rest of this section we will show that sequential is generally better and that
the ability sets where simultaneous is better tend to be relatively homogeneous. Mainly
we will show the results of computer calculations.
4.5.1 Which voting scheme is generally more reliable?
As we have established that for certain deck sizes and ability sets either sequential voting
or simultaneous voting can be more reliable. That is, there is no result stating that one
of these two schemes is always better. However, in this Subsection, we establish that
the Alpern-Chen sequential voting is always better than simultaneous voting in terms
of both the average reliability and the optimality fraction.
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Average reliability
We recall that the average reliability for a voting scheme, for fixed deck size D, is the
average of its reliability over all ability sets with distinct abilities. The average reliability
is thus the expected value of the reliability for a randomly chosen jury. Note that in
Example 1 where D = 4, the only distinct-ability set is {1, 2, 3}, so the average ability
is the same as the reliability for this set. There we showed that sequential voting in the
Alpern-Chen order (as well as any order where the juror of ability 3 does not vote last)
has reliability 1, and simultaneous voting has reliability 8/9.
For values of D from 6 to 52, the average reliabilities were shown earlier in
two of the curves (the highest line for sequential Alpern-Chen and the dashed-line for
simultaneous) in Figure 4.3. The calculations illustrated in Figure 4.3 establish the
following result.
Proposition 14. For a three-member jury and deck sizes D, 4 ≤ D ≤ 52, the average re-
liability of sequential voting in the Alpern-Chen order is higher than that of simultaneous
voting. The difference is always at least 0.035.
Superiority fraction
We now compare sequential and simultaneous voting, for fixed deck size D, in terms
of the fraction of ability sets for which each gives a higher reliability. In particular let
the superiority fraction φ̂ (D) denote the fraction of ability sets for which simultaneous
voting has higher or equal reliability that sequential voting. Recall from our re-analysis
above of Example 1 for simultaneous voting in the first part of this section that for D = 4
there is only one ability set {1, 2, 3} and sequential voting has the higher reliability, so
φ̂ (4) = 0. By a small amount of computation, we find that φ̂ (D) = 0 for all D < 12. The
computations for D = 12, 14, . . . , 52 are shown in Table 4.9 in the Appendix, leading to
the following result. for most ability sets, sequential voting has higher reliability than
simultaneous voting, in the following precise sense.
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Proposition 15. The superiority fraction φ̂ (D) satisfies the following
1. For D satisfying 4 ≤ D ≤ 10, φ̂ (D) = 0.
2. For D satisfying 12 ≤ D ≤ 52, φ̂ (D) ≤ 0.0268.
4.5.2 Which ability sets do better with each scheme?
In Section 4.5.1, we asked for how many ability sets simultaneous voting has a higher
reliability than the Alpern-Chen sequential voting. Now we ask for which ability sets
simultaneous voting is better. We are not concerned with giving a list of these sets, but
rather a characterization of them. It turns out that the property of a jury that most
determines which voting scheme is more reliable is the heterogeneity of jurors’ abilities.
We can measure this by the standard deviation of the ability set or the spread δ = y−x,
the difference between its highest ability y and its lowest ability x. Higher heterogeneity
generally means that sequential voting is more likely to be superior. First, we consider
only middle centered ability sets, those with the middle ability m = D/2. These sets
are easily illustrated in a two dimensional array, as in Figure 4.4. Then, we relax
the restriction on the middle ability, but still consider the spread as the homogeneity
measure. Note that in this analysis we revert to our usual restriction that the abilities are
distinct, unlike the special common-ability examples of {1, 1, 1} and {2, 2, 2} discussed
at the beginning of the section for ease of presentation.
Spread analysis for centered ability sets
One way to illustrate locations of these ability sets is to produce a two dimensional (x, y)
array for centered ability sets. More specifically, we condsider ability sets of the form
{x,m, y} , m = D/2, with x < m < y, where the middle ability is m = D/2. Therefore,
we can also use integer pair (x, y) to represent the ability set {x,m, y} . If for this ability
set simultaneous voting has a higher reliability than sequential voting in the Alpern-
Chen order (m, y, x) , we label (x, y) with a small dot. We call such an ability set dotted
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ability set. This is drawn in Figure 4.4 for the standard deck size D = 52, m = 26.
Figure 4.4: Scatter plot of dotted ability sets {x,m, y} for D = 52.
Note that all the dotted points lie in the triangle under the line d = y − x =
D/4 + 1 = 14, which contains the 1/8 most homogeneous points (ability sets) with
respect to the spread measure y − x, the difference between the highest and lowest
abilities. We also draw a line of constant standard deviation going through the point
of ability set {15, 26, 29}, namely σ = 7.37 and show that all the dotted points are
below this line. Also note that the most homogeneous point (25, 27) , corresponding
to the ability set {25, 26, 27} = {m− 1,m,m+ 1} , is dotted. Note that this point is
not dotted for Example 1 with D = 4 and unique ability set {1, 2, 3} , where sequential
voting is superior. However it is dotted for sufficiently large deck size D. Also note that
when D = 52, most of the dotted points have both coordinates odd - this changes to
all such points for smaller deck sizes. Recall that jurors with odd abilities cannot draw
an equal number of cards of each color – ties are impossible. The lack of ties seems
to favor simultaneous voting. The generalizations of observations regarding Figure 4.4
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(D = 52) that hold for other values of D are listed in the following proposition .The
data for establishing this result for D < 52 is in Figure 4.7 in the Appendix.
Proposition 16. For D ≡ 2m ≤ 52, consider ability sets of the form A = {x,m, y}
with 1 ≤ x < m < y < D. We say that A is dotted (as in Figure 4.4) if the reliability of
simultaneous voting with abilities A is greater than or equal to the reliability of sequential
voting in the Alpern-Chen order. Then
1. If D ≤ 10 or D is not divisible by 4, then there are no dotted points, that is, the
Alpern-Chen sequential voting is always more reliable.
2. Suppose D satisfies 12 ≤ D ≤ 52 and is divisible by 4. Then all dotted ability
sets A are in the triangular set y ≤ x + D/4 + 1 (with the lowest 1/8 of spread
y−x). In particular, the most homogeneous ability set {m− 1,m,m+ 1} is dotted.
Furthermore if D ≤ 32 then all dotted points (ability sets) have both x and y odd.
Spread analysis for general ability sets
We now consider the usual deck size D = 52 and consider arbitrary ability sets {a, b, c}
with a < b < c, where the spread is given by δ = c − a. In Figure 4.5, we plot for
each value of δ from 2 to 20 the number of ability sets (blue) and the number of these
for which the sequential voting is superior to simultaneous voting (total ability sets
deducted by the number of dotted ability sets, indicated by orange line). Although δ
can go up to 51−1 = 50, it turns out that for δ ≥ 16, none of the ability sets are dotted,
so we plot only up to 20. For example, when δ = 2 there are 50 ability sets (of the
form {x, x+ 1, x+ 2}) and 23 of them are dotted (have higher reliability when voting
simultaneously).
These results are consistent with the observation of Ben-Yashar and Nitzar [21],
in another model, that in order to produce high reliability with simultaneous voting, a
high degree of homogeneity of abilities is required.
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Figure 4.5: Relationship between δ, #δ, and #seq(δ) for fixed D = 52.
4.5.3 Reliability and heterogeneity
Kanazawa [44] has shown that the reliability of Condorcet simultaneous voting, for juries
of fixed mean of the p value, is increasing in the standard deviation σ of the jury. Here,
we show that this is true in terms of the mean and standard deviation of the ability set
for both sequential and simultaneous reliability. The additional reliability of sequential
over simultaneous voting is also increasing in heterogeneity (as measured by σ).
We illustrate these observations in Figures 4.6 by fixing deck size at D = 52 and
consider juries with ability sets which have a fixed mean of 26. For each such ability
set A = {a, b, c} we plot two points: (σA, Q (b, c, a)) and (σA, Qsim (A)) , both on the
same vertical line with horizontal coordinate σA. The horizontal coordinate σ goes from
1 (for the single ability set {25, 26, 27}) to 25 (for the single ability set {1, 26, 51}). From
Proposition 16, part 2, we know that for σ = 1({25, 26, 27} is dotted) the blue point is
above the orange point. Note that for any ability set where the highest ability c is 51,
the reliability of the sequential voting is 1. There are 13 such ability sets, of the form
(a, b) = (x, 27− x) , for x = 1, . . . , 13. These are the 13 points at height (reliability) 1.
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Figure 4.6: Plots of Qsim(A) and Q(b, c, a) against σ of ability sets {a, b, c}
.
Our observations about reliability increasing with heterogeneity are based on the
pattern of the orange dots (sequential reliability) and the blue triangles (simultaneous
reliability) in Figure 4.6. We also plot the line corresponding to the averages of the
reliabilities for each standard deviation for both the orange dots and the blue triangles.
When the standard deviation is larger than 22, we have 13 ability sets containing the
juror of ability 51 (reliability is 1 for sequential voting and around 0.78 for simultaneous).
This is why the lines are erratic (the higher peak when averaging with reliability 1)
between the standard deviation of 22 and 25. These lines increase as the standard
deviation becomes larger given that the mean of the ability sets is fixed to 26. This also
gives support to the observation of Grofman and Feld [37] that diversity of opinion is a
means of arriving at the correct collective decision under democratic majoritarian rules.
It can also be seen in the figure that when the standard deviation is very small, the
blue line is above the orange line. For instance when the standard deviation is 1, this
corresponds to the single ability set {25, 26, 27} where the blue dot is higher than the
orange dot. As the standard deviation increases, the difference between these two lines
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also increases with sequential voting (orange line) consistently produces higher reliability
than the simultaneous voting. This indicates that the relative advantage of sequential
over simultaneous voting increases with heterogeneity. This result goes in the same
direction as Theorem 5 of Alpern and Chen [4].
4.6 Average Reliability For n = 5
Up to now we have considered the optimal voting ordering for a jury of size three, for
which we have definitive results. In this section, we consider sequential jury voting when
the jury consists of five jurors. We are still able to use our exhaustive calculation method
to obtain the average reliability Q̄(r) for all orderings r ∈ Π5.
Voting orderings D = 12 D = 14 . . . D = 30
r1 = (d, a, e, c, b) 0.822 0.801 . . . 0.718
r2 = (d, b, e, c, a) 0.817 0.798 . . . 0.717
r3 = (c, a, e, d, b) 0.815 0.795 . . . 0.715
r4 = (c, b, e, d, a) 0.802 0.785 . . . 0.713
r5 = (d, c, e, b, a) 0.801 0.783 . . . 0.710
Table 4.4: Average reliabilities of the highest five orderings
Of these Π5 = 120 orderings, Table 4.4 gives the average reliabilities of the top
five orderings, for various deck sizes. For sizes starting with D = 12, these remain the
same. The full data is provided in Table 4.10 in the Appendix. So we have the following
result.
Proposition 17. Given a deck size between 12 and 30, and a five-member jury of
abilities {a, b, c, d, e} with 0 < a < b < c < d < e < D, the voting orders with the five
highest average reliabilities are, in decreasing order, r1 to r5 as labeled in Table 4.4.
For comparison with the Alpern-Chen ordering of three jurors, note that for all these
orderings, the most able juror (ability e) votes in the middle position (third).
Table 4.5 lists the top five voting orders for average reliability. The same five





1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
r1 (Best) d a e c b
r2 d b e c a
r3 c a e d b
r4 c b e d a
r5 d c e b a









Table 4.5: Average ability of ith juror to vote, among top five orderings
juror to vote, for the top five voting orders. We now wish to compare our results for
juries of size five with our earlier results (and those of Alpern and Chen [2]) for juries
of size three. To do this, we partition the five jurors in voting order into three groups:
Early, Middle and Late (E,M,L). If we had six jurors, this would be simple, with two
in each group. To convert five to three, we must put the second voter partly into E
and partly into M . Similar partition applies for the fourth voter. To have the same
fractional number of jurors in each group, we put the second voter fractionally 2/3 into
E and 1/3 into M , and similarly for the fourth voter. This puts 5/3 voters into each of
the three groups, with total weight 3(5/3) = 5 for the three groups, as required. Since
the fractional weight of each group is thus 5/3, we must divide by 5/3 to get the average
































For comparison between the average abilities of the three groups, we calculate
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25(E − L) = 5(d− a) + 4(c− b) > 0, and
25(M − E) = 15e− (7d+ 5c+ b+ 2a) ≥ 15(e− d) > 0.
Thus, we have shown the following
Proposition 18. Given any deck size 12 ≤ D ≤ 30, for any five-member jury with
abilities 0 < a < b < c < d < e < D, and any of the top five orderings in terms of
average reliability, we have that
L < E < M,
This says that early voters have middle ability, the late voters have lowest ability and




The paper of [2] gives us a simple model of sequential majority jury voting between two
equiprobable states of Nature. Their paper shows that when jurors of differing abilities
vote sequentially, the reliability of the majority verdict depends on the voting order and
the best one is the Alpern-Chen ordering of middle, high, low. In that paper, the notion
of ability is defined as a variable in terms of the quality of a juror’s private information.
In this paper, we introduce a new measurement of a juror’s ability, which is simply the
number of cards he is allowed to sample from a predetermined deck of cards, in order to
guess the one which has been removed from the deck.
We have shown that in our sealed card model, the Alpern-Chen ordering generally
has the highest reliability. For decks of size up to 16, this ordering always maximizes
the reliability of the majority verdict. For any medium size decks (D ≤ 52), the Alpern-
Chen Ordering is the best one for more juries than any other voting order. We also find
that for each deck size, the average reliability of the Alpern-Chen ordering, taken over
all possible juries, is higher than for any other ordering.
Having established the optimal ordering, we are able to fix this ordering and
make reliability comparisons with other voting schemes. We compare the reliability
of the sequential voting scheme with the more familiar simultaneous voting scheme.
We showed that in general, sequential voting using the Alpern Chen ordering is better
than simultaneous voting in terms of both the average reliability and the optimality
fraction. We further asked for which ability sets, if exist, where simultaneous voting is
better than Alpern Chen sequential voting. To do this, we define a spread of the set
of juror abilities with smaller spread representing more homogeneous juries. We have
found that for sufficiently homogeneous juries, simultaneous voting can sometimes have
higher reliability than sequential voting. On the other hand, when juries are sufficiently
heterogeneous, sequential voting is more reliable. In a similar vein, we have found that
the reliability of a jury of fixed average ability is increasing in its heterogeneity.
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For a jury of size five we show that the five highest voting orders, in terms of
average reliability, all have the most able juror voting in the middle (third) position.
This is an analog of the Alpern-Chen ordering. We also show that these orderings, when
grouped into early, middle and late voters have the following: early voters have middle





D Ability sets (b, c, a)∗ > (b, a, c) | (a, c, b) > (a, b, c) < (c, b, a) > (c, a, b)
8 {2, 4, 6} 0.7878 0.6834 0.7551 0.6933 0.7469 0.7143
{2, 4, 6} 0.6882 0.6352 0.6705 0.6403 0.6718 0.6429
{2, 4, 8} 0.7751 0.6526 0.7531 0.6628 0.7275 0.7222
10 {2, 6, 8} 0.8016 0.6429 0.7531 0.6987 0.7538 0.7222
{4, 6, 8} 0.8016 0.7109 0.7751 0.7197 0.7606 0.7285
{2, 4, 6} 0.6383 0.6075 0.6296 0.6107 0.6328 0.6082
{2, 4, 8} 0.6860 0.6172 0.6723 0.6228 0.6575 0.6515
{2, 4, 10} 0.7686 0.6344 0.7521 0.6453 0.7294 0.7273
{2, 6, 8} 0.7007 0.6082 0.6741 0.6469 0.6801 0.6515
{2, 6, 10} 0.7863 0.6082 0.7521 0.6714 0.7361 0.7273
12 {2, 8, 10} 0.8099 0.6515 0.7521 0.7022 0.7578 0.7273
{4, 6, 8} 0.7015 0.6592 0.6883 0.6637 0.6867 0.6586
{4, 6, 10} 0.7863 0.6794 0.7686 0.6869 0.7363 0.7308
{4, 8, 10} 0.8099 0.6620 0.7686 0.7177 0.7628 0.7318
{6, 8, 10} 0.8099 0.7257 0.7863 0.7342 0.7691 0.7379
{2, 4, 6} 0.6125 0.5893 0.6032 0.5916 0.6085 0.5874
{2, 4, 8} 0.6422 0.5959 0.6330 0.5997 0.6224 0.6166
{2, 4, 10} 0.6851 0.6053 0.6743 0.6115 0.6608 0.6573
{2, 4, 12} 0.7647 0.6223 0.7515 0.6338 0.7308 0.7308
{2, 6, 8} 0.6522 0.5874 0.6350 0.6177 0.6413 0.6166
{2, 6, 10} 0.6959 0.5874 0.6743 0.6305 0.6674 0.6573
∗The boldface under (b, c, a) corresponds to Proposition 8, the one “ < ” covers Proposition 9, and
the three “ > ”s indicate Proposition 10.
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{2, 6, 12} 0.7778 0.5874 0.7515 0.6549 0.7342 0.7308
{2, 8, 10} 0.7087 0.6166 0.6767 0.6512 0.6853 0.6573
{2, 8, 12} 0.7935 0.6166 0.7515 0.6768 0.7421 0.7308
{2, 10, 12} 0.8155 0.6573 0.7515 0.7047 0.7605 0.7308
14 {4, 6, 8} 0.6514 0.6286 0.6433 0.6315 0.6472 0.6234
{4, 6, 10} 0.6956 0.6398 0.6856 0.6439 0.6677 0.6621
{4, 6, 12} 0.7778 0.6602 0.7647 0.6673 0.7351 0.7308
{4, 8, 10} 0.7089 0.6257 0.6879 0.6643 0.6905 0.6630
{4, 8, 12} 0.7935 0.6284 0.7647 0.6889 0.7422 0.7308
{4, 10, 12} 0.8155 0.6667 0.7647 0.7169 0.7641 0.7308
{6, 8, 10} 0.7103 0.6732 0.6991 0.6775 0.6965 0.6695
{6, 8, 12} 0.7935 0.6943 0.7778 0.7009 0.7424 0.7371
{6, 10, 12} 0.8155 0.6750 0.7778 0.7290 0.7688 0.7388
{8, 10, 12} 0.8155 0.7352 0.7935 0.7435 0.7748 0.7444
{2, 4, 6} 0.5949 0.5764 0.5875 0.5782 0.5919 0.5734
{2, 4, 8} 0.6157 0.5814 0.6089 0.5842 0.6007 0.5952
{2, 4, 10} 0.6435 0.5877 0.6353 0.5920 0.6262 0.6224
{2, 4, 12} 0.6847 0.5968 0.6759 0.6037 0.6630 0.6615
{2, 4, 14} 0.7621 0.6137 0.7511 0.6256 0.7333 0.7333
{2, 6, 8} 0.6214 0.5734 0.6075 0.5985 0.6168 0.5952
{2, 6, 10} 0.6511 0.5734 0.6366 0.6069 0.6323 0.6224
{2, 6, 12} 0.6932 0.5734 0.6760 0.6197 0.6673 0.6615
(2,6,14) 0.7725 0.5734 0.7511 0.6439 0.7338 0.7333
{2, 8, 10} 0.6597 0.5952 0.6388 0.6223 0.6468 0.6224
{2, 8, 12} 0.7025 0.5952 0.6759 0.6357 0.6745 0.6615
{2, 8, 14} 0.7841 0.5952 0.7511 0.6612 0.7377 0.7333
{2, 10, 12} 0.7143 0.6224 0.6786 0.6542 0.6888 0.6615
100
{2, 10, 14} 0.7986 0.6224 0.7511 0.6807 0.7464 0.7333
{2, 12, 14} 0.8195 0.6615 0.7511 0.7065 0.7623 0.7333
{4, 6, 8} 0.6249 0.6081 0.6189 0.6101 0.6219 0.6017
{4, 6, 10} 0.6518 0.6157 0.6453 0.6184 0.6326 0.6273
{4, 6, 12} 0.6932 0.6267 0.6848 0.6308 0.6681 0.6643
16 {4, 6, 14} 0.7725 0.6472 0.7621 0.6542 0.7338 0.7333
{4, 8, 10} 0.6564 0.6034 0.6434 0.6335 0.6517 0.6281
{4, 8, 12} 0.7025 0.6049 0.6853 0.6464 0.6747 0.6651
{4, 8, 14} 0.7841 0.6078 0.7621 0.6711 0.7385 0.7333
{4, 10, 12} 0.7139 0.6305 0.6879 0.6650 0.6930 0.6660
{4, 10, 14} 0.7986 0.6332 0.7621 0.6905 0.7464 0.7333
{4, 12, 14} 0.8195 0.6698 0.7621 0.7165 0.7651 0.7333
{6, 8, 10} 0.6607 0.6415 0.6543 0.6442 0.6569 0.6343
{6, 8, 12} 0.7024 0.6532 0.6942 0.6567 0.6751 0.6701
{6, 8, 14} 0.7841 0.6748 0.7725 0.6805 0.7394 0.7339
{6, 10, 12} 0.7148 0.6381 0.6967 0.6753 0.6977 0.6715
{6, 10, 14} 0.7986 0.6425 0.7725 0.6998 0.7466 0.7340
{6, 12, 14} 0.8195 0.6776 0.7725 0.7261 0.7687 0.7341
{8, 10, 12} 0.7166 0.6825 0.7065 0.6867 0.7034 0.6773
{8, 10, 14} 0.7986 0.7041 0.7841 0.7102 0.7469 0.7419
{8, 12, 14} 0.8195 0.6843 0.7841 0.7367 0.7731 0.7439
{10, 12, 14} 0.8195 0.7418 0.7986 0.7500 0.7789 0.7492
Table 4.6: Reliability Q for D ≤ 16 and even ability, Propo-




(a, b, c) (a, c, b) (b, a, c) (b, c, a) (c, a, b) (c, b, a) Sum
4 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 4.000
6 0.000 0.800 0.000 0.900 0.600 0.600 2.900
8 0.029 0.629 0.000 0.800 0.429 0.486 2.371
10 0.012 0.524 0.000 0.750 0.345 0.440 2.071
12 0.012 0.479 0.000 0.685 0.291 0.406 1.873
14 0.007 0.444 0.000 0.675 0.248 0.385 1.759
16 0.007 0.398 0.000 0.659 0.235 0.367 1.666
18 0.010 0.372 0.000 0.651 0.212 0.351 1.597
20 0.009 0.348 0.000 0.654 0.199 0.335 1.546
22 0.008 0.328 0.000 0.650 0.182 0.329 1.498
24 0.007 0.318 0.000 0.640 0.177 0.318 1.461
26 0.006 0.298 0.000 0.652 0.167 0.305 1.427
28 0.005 0.281 0.000 0.650 0.162 0.300 1.399
30 0.005 0.264 0.000 0.647 0.162 0.297 1.375
32 0.006 0.255 0.000 0.644 0.156 0.295 1.356
34 0.006 0.247 0.000 0.643 0.151 0.291 1.338
36 0.006 0.238 0.000 0.640 0.153 0.282 1.319
38 0.006 0.230 0.000 0.641 0.150 0.278 1.305
40 0.007 0.225 0.000 0.638 0.152 0.272 1.293
42 0.007 0.220 0.000 0.637 0.148 0.268 1.280
44 0.006 0.217 0.000 0.634 0.147 0.266 1.270
46 0.006 0.211 0.000 0.633 0.148 0.261 1.260
48 0.006 0.206 0.000 0.629 0.151 0.258 1.250
50 0.007 0.204 0.000 0.629 0.147 0.256 1.242
52 0.007 0.200 0.000 0.630 0.148 0.253 1.238




(a,b,c) (a,c,b) (b,a,c) (b,c,a) (c,a,b) (c,b,a) simultaneous
4 0.7778 1 0.8889 1 1 1 0.888999
6 0.7678 0.9006 0.7025 0.9096 0.86695 0.8896 0.8146
8 0.744128 0.843855 0.681486 0.85628 0.8088 0.839024 0.774127
10 0.725061 0.812857 0.659651 0.822672 0.772841 0.803265 0.747348
12 0.704583 0.785297 0.652501 0.796018 0.750056 0.77844 0.727762
14 0.692853 0.768276 0.640532 0.776651 0.730099 0.758285 0.712546
16 0.682228 0.751981 0.635073 0.760459 0.717897 0.743916 0.700239
18 0.672185 0.738815 0.627091 0.746923 0.705303 0.730055 0.689993
20 0.664594 0.727777 0.621887 0.735475 0.695876 0.719259 0.681275
22 0.658326 0.718764 0.616938 0.725789 0.687751 0.709833 0.67373
24 0.652772 0.710041 0.614211 0.716997 0.681314 0.70195 0.667109
26 0.647514 0.702963 0.60912 0.709481 0.673368 0.69456 0.661234
28 0.642993 0.696167 0.60641 0.702621 0.669046 0.688619 0.655971
30 0.638499 0.689947 0.603337 0.696407 0.663914 0.682538 0.651218
32 0.634848 0.684518 0.600855 0.690692 0.658975 0.677337 0.646897
34 0.631287 0.679688 0.598015 0.685594 0.654575 0.672615 0.642943
36 0.62775 0.674934 0.596187 0.680797 0.651382 0.668366 0.639308
38 0.624959 0.670851 0.59369 0.676422 0.647283 0.664191 0.635949
40 0.622059 0.666824 0.592177 0.672309 0.644644 0.660627 0.632833
42 0.619261 0.663077 0.590193 0.66847 0.641029 0.657066 0.62993
44 0.616911 0.659695 0.588524 0.664908 0.638197 0.653857 0.627218
46 0.614529 0.656505 0.586695 0.661634 0.63587 0.650837 0.624676
48 0.612361 0.653408 0.58549 0.65846 0.633715 0.648017 0.622286
50 0.610391 0.650569 0.583772 0.655492 0.630596 0.645235 0.620035
52 0.608398 0.647872 0.582477 0.652719 0.62865 0.64278 0.617907
Table 4.8: Average reliability Q̄ for D ≤ 52
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D 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
φ̂(D) 0.0242 0.021 0.022 0.0235 0.0268 0.0248 0.0226 0.0204
D 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42
φ̂(D) 0.0191 0.0175 0.0165 0.0163 0.0163 0.0156 0.0165 0.0173
D 44 46 48 50 52
φ̂(D) 0.0168 0.0178 0.0179 0.0181 0.0187











12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
(d, a, e, c, b)† 0.822 0.802 0.785 0.771 0.759 0.747 0.737 0.733 0.724 0.718
(d, b, e, c, a) 0.817 0.797 0.781 0.768 0.757 0.746 0.736 0.732 0.723 0.717
(c, a, e, d, b) 0.814 0.795 0.779 0.766 0.755 0.744 0.734 0.729 0.721 0.715
(c, b, e, d, a) 0.802 0.785 0.771 0.760 0.750 0.741 0.732 0.727 0.719 0.714
(d, c, e, b, a) 0.801 0.783 0.769 0.756 0.745 0.736 0.727 0.722 0.714 0.709
(a, b, c, d, e) 0.724 0.711 0.699 0.689 0.681 0.674 0.665 0.662 0.655 0.651
(a, b, c, e, d) 0.770 0.754 0.740 0.729 0.720 0.712 0.703 0.699 0.692 0.687
(a, b, d, c, e) 0.715 0.700 0.688 0.678 0.670 0.663 0.655 0.652 0.646 0.643
(a, b, d, e, c) 0.782 0.768 0.756 0.745 0.736 0.728 0.718 0.714 0.706 0.702
(a, b, e, c, d) 0.742 0.726 0.713 0.701 0.692 0.685 0.676 0.672 0.666 0.662
(a, b, e, d, c) 0.784 0.770 0.758 0.747 0.738 0.730 0.722 0.717 0.710 0.705
(a, c, b, d, e) 0.732 0.718 0.705 0.695 0.686 0.679 0.671 0.667 0.660 0.656
(a, c, b, e, d) 0.762 0.745 0.732 0.721 0.712 0.704 0.696 0.692 0.686 0.681
(a, c, d, b, e) 0.723 0.708 0.696 0.685 0.677 0.670 0.662 0.659 0.653 0.648
(a, c, d, e, b) 0.794 0.778 0.764 0.752 0.743 0.734 0.725 0.720 0.712 0.707
(a, c, e, b, d) 0.719 0.707 0.697 0.689 0.682 0.675 0.669 0.666 0.661 0.658
(a, c, e, d, b) 0.785 0.771 0.759 0.748 0.739 0.731 0.723 0.718 0.711 0.706
(a, d, b, c, e) 0.737 0.722 0.711 0.701 0.693 0.685 0.677 0.673 0.667 0.663
(a, d, b, e, c) 0.771 0.756 0.743 0.732 0.723 0.715 0.706 0.702 0.695 0.690
(a, d, c, b, e) 0.731 0.718 0.706 0.696 0.688 0.682 0.673 0.669 0.663 0.659
(a, d, c, e, b) 0.789 0.771 0.757 0.745 0.735 0.726 0.717 0.712 0.705 0.700
(a, d, e, b, c) 0.742 0.728 0.717 0.708 0.701 0.694 0.688 0.684 0.677 0.674
(a, d, e, c, b) 0.770 0.756 0.746 0.736 0.728 0.721 0.714 0.710 0.703 0.699
†These are the highest five orderings as stated in Proposition 17
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(a, e, b, c, d) 0.769 0.755 0.742 0.732 0.722 0.715 0.707 0.703 0.695 0.691
(a, e, b, d, c) 0.761 0.747 0.735 0.725 0.716 0.709 0.701 0.697 0.690 0.686
(a, e, c, b, d) 0.767 0.753 0.741 0.731 0.721 0.714 0.706 0.702 0.695 0.691
(a, e, c, d, b) 0.762 0.749 0.739 0.729 0.720 0.712 0.704 0.700 0.693 0.689
(a, e, d, b, c) 0.773 0.759 0.747 0.737 0.728 0.720 0.712 0.708 0.701 0.696
(a, e, d, c, b) 0.765 0.752 0.741 0.731 0.722 0.715 0.707 0.703 0.696 0.691
(b, a, c, d, e) 0.692 0.685 0.676 0.668 0.660 0.657 0.648 0.645 0.637 0.634
(b, a, c, e, d) 0.754 0.744 0.732 0.721 0.711 0.704 0.695 0.691 0.683 0.679
(b, a, d, c, e) 0.680 0.670 0.661 0.653 0.647 0.645 0.636 0.634 0.627 0.625
(b, a, d, e, c) 0.775 0.760 0.748 0.738 0.728 0.721 0.712 0.707 0.699 0.695
(b, a, e, c, d) 0.729 0.711 0.697 0.686 0.676 0.671 0.661 0.657 0.650 0.646
(b, a, e, d, c) 0.796 0.779 0.765 0.752 0.742 0.733 0.723 0.719 0.711 0.705
(b, c, a, d, e) 0.716 0.704 0.694 0.684 0.677 0.670 0.663 0.659 0.653 0.649
(b, c, a, e, d) 0.736 0.722 0.711 0.702 0.694 0.689 0.680 0.677 0.669 0.665
(b, c, d, a, e) 0.717 0.705 0.693 0.683 0.675 0.668 0.661 0.657 0.652 0.648
(b, c, d, e, a) 0.795 0.779 0.765 0.754 0.744 0.735 0.726 0.721 0.714 0.709
(b, c, e, a, d) 0.704 0.696 0.688 0.681 0.676 0.670 0.666 0.664 0.658 0.656
(b, c, e, d, a) 0.789 0.775 0.762 0.751 0.742 0.734 0.725 0.720 0.713 0.708
(b, d, a, c, e) 0.742 0.727 0.714 0.704 0.695 0.688 0.679 0.675 0.668 0.664
(b, d, a, e, c) 0.756 0.742 0.730 0.720 0.712 0.705 0.697 0.693 0.685 0.681
(b, d, c, a, e) 0.734 0.720 0.707 0.696 0.688 0.681 0.672 0.668 0.661 0.657
(b, d, c, e, a) 0.786 0.770 0.756 0.744 0.735 0.726 0.717 0.713 0.706 0.701
(b, d, e, a, c) 0.720 0.712 0.704 0.697 0.692 0.686 0.681 0.678 0.671 0.669
(b, d, e, c, a) 0.772 0.758 0.747 0.737 0.729 0.722 0.714 0.711 0.703 0.699
(b, e, a, c, d) 0.765 0.754 0.741 0.731 0.721 0.714 0.705 0.702 0.695 0.690
(b, e, a, d, c) 0.760 0.749 0.736 0.726 0.717 0.709 0.701 0.697 0.690 0.686
(b, e, c, a, d) 0.763 0.749 0.738 0.728 0.719 0.713 0.705 0.701 0.694 0.690
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(b, e, c, d, a) 0.763 0.750 0.739 0.730 0.721 0.714 0.705 0.702 0.694 0.690
(b, e, d, a, c) 0.765 0.754 0.744 0.735 0.726 0.719 0.712 0.708 0.701 0.697
(b, e, d, c, a) 0.758 0.745 0.736 0.727 0.718 0.712 0.704 0.700 0.693 0.689
(c, a, b, d, e) 0.712 0.698 0.686 0.677 0.669 0.660 0.654 0.650 0.643 0.640
(c, a, b, e, d) 0.748 0.733 0.720 0.710 0.702 0.693 0.685 0.681 0.675 0.671
(c, a, d, b, e) 0.692 0.682 0.672 0.664 0.657 0.651 0.645 0.642 0.637 0.633
(c, a, d, e, b) 0.789 0.774 0.759 0.748 0.738 0.729 0.719 0.714 0.706 0.701
(c, a, e, b, d) 0.704 0.690 0.678 0.670 0.663 0.656 0.650 0.647 0.642 0.638
(c, b, a, d, e) 0.700 0.689 0.679 0.671 0.663 0.656 0.650 0.646 0.641 0.638
(c, b, a, e, d) 0.723 0.710 0.699 0.692 0.684 0.678 0.671 0.667 0.662 0.658
(c, b, d, a, e) 0.700 0.690 0.681 0.672 0.665 0.659 0.652 0.649 0.644 0.640
(c, b, d, e, a) 0.786 0.772 0.760 0.750 0.740 0.732 0.723 0.718 0.710 0.706
(c, b, e, a, d) 0.699 0.689 0.680 0.672 0.666 0.659 0.655 0.652 0.648 0.645
(c, d, a, b, e) 0.745 0.730 0.716 0.705 0.695 0.688 0.679 0.676 0.669 0.664
(c, d, a, e, b) 0.765 0.750 0.737 0.726 0.716 0.708 0.700 0.696 0.689 0.684
(c, d, b, a, e) 0.738 0.723 0.710 0.699 0.689 0.682 0.673 0.671 0.664 0.659
(c, d, b, e, a) 0.773 0.758 0.745 0.734 0.725 0.716 0.708 0.704 0.697 0.692
(c, d, e, a, b) 0.738 0.727 0.717 0.708 0.700 0.694 0.688 0.685 0.679 0.675
(c, d, e, b, a) 0.771 0.757 0.745 0.735 0.727 0.721 0.713 0.710 0.703 0.699
(c, e, a, b, d) 0.758 0.747 0.736 0.727 0.719 0.711 0.704 0.700 0.694 0.689
(c, e, a, d, b) 0.753 0.742 0.732 0.722 0.715 0.708 0.701 0.696 0.690 0.686
(c, e, b, a, d) 0.756 0.744 0.734 0.725 0.717 0.710 0.703 0.698 0.692 0.688
(c, e, b, d, a) 0.756 0.745 0.735 0.726 0.718 0.712 0.704 0.699 0.693 0.688
(c, e, d, a, b) 0.753 0.745 0.737 0.730 0.722 0.716 0.710 0.705 0.700 0.696
(c, e, d, b, a) 0.742 0.735 0.727 0.721 0.713 0.707 0.701 0.697 0.691 0.687
(d, a, b, c, e) 0.713 0.702 0.691 0.683 0.675 0.667 0.661 0.657 0.651 0.648
(d, a, b, e, c) 0.749 0.737 0.724 0.715 0.707 0.699 0.692 0.687 0.681 0.677
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(d, a, c, b, e) 0.707 0.697 0.688 0.680 0.673 0.666 0.660 0.656 0.650 0.647
(d, a, c, e, b) 0.771 0.756 0.742 0.732 0.723 0.714 0.705 0.701 0.694 0.689
(d, a, e, b, c) 0.753 0.737 0.722 0.710 0.700 0.692 0.683 0.678 0.671 0.667
(d, b, a, c, e) 0.711 0.700 0.689 0.680 0.673 0.666 0.659 0.656 0.649 0.646
(d, b, a, e, c) 0.734 0.725 0.712 0.703 0.696 0.689 0.682 0.678 0.671 0.668
(d, b, c, a, e) 0.715 0.703 0.693 0.684 0.676 0.669 0.663 0.659 0.653 0.649
(d, b, c, e, a) 0.779 0.763 0.749 0.739 0.730 0.722 0.712 0.708 0.701 0.696
(d, b, e, a, c) 0.724 0.715 0.701 0.692 0.684 0.677 0.671 0.668 0.662 0.659
(d, c, a, b, e) 0.722 0.710 0.700 0.690 0.681 0.674 0.667 0.663 0.657 0.653
(d, c, a, e, b) 0.749 0.733 0.721 0.712 0.704 0.698 0.689 0.686 0.679 0.675
(d, c, b, a, e) 0.723 0.710 0.699 0.689 0.680 0.672 0.666 0.662 0.656 0.652
(d, c, b, e, a) 0.765 0.748 0.736 0.726 0.718 0.710 0.702 0.698 0.692 0.687
(d, c, e, a, b) 0.744 0.730 0.719 0.710 0.701 0.694 0.687 0.683 0.677 0.673
(d, c, e, b, a) 0.801 0.783 0.769 0.756 0.745 0.736 0.727 0.722 0.714 0.709
(d, e, a, b, c) 0.738 0.729 0.722 0.715 0.706 0.700 0.695 0.692 0.687 0.684
(d, e, a, c, b) 0.726 0.720 0.714 0.708 0.698 0.693 0.689 0.686 0.681 0.679
(d, e, b, a, c) 0.751 0.741 0.729 0.722 0.711 0.706 0.701 0.698 0.691 0.688
(d, e, b, c, a) 0.743 0.735 0.724 0.717 0.706 0.701 0.695 0.693 0.686 0.683
(d, e, c, a, b) 0.749 0.741 0.732 0.725 0.715 0.711 0.704 0.702 0.696 0.692
(d, e, c, b, a) 0.740 0.734 0.723 0.717 0.707 0.703 0.696 0.694 0.688 0.684
(e, a, b, c, d) 0.746 0.732 0.720 0.711 0.704 0.697 0.690 0.687 0.681 0.677
(e, a, b, d, c) 0.732 0.720 0.711 0.703 0.696 0.690 0.683 0.680 0.674 0.671
(e, a, c, b, d) 0.743 0.727 0.716 0.707 0.699 0.693 0.686 0.683 0.677 0.674
(e, a, c, d, b) 0.740 0.726 0.715 0.707 0.700 0.694 0.687 0.683 0.678 0.675
(e, a, d, b, c) 0.746 0.730 0.719 0.710 0.702 0.696 0.688 0.685 0.678 0.675
(e, a, d, c, b) 0.749 0.732 0.720 0.711 0.703 0.697 0.689 0.686 0.679 0.676
(e, b, a, c, d) 0.745 0.732 0.721 0.713 0.704 0.698 0.692 0.688 0.680 0.678
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(e, b, a, d, c) 0.740 0.726 0.717 0.709 0.701 0.694 0.688 0.682 0.676 0.675
(e, b, c, a, d) 0.731 0.719 0.711 0.705 0.698 0.692 0.687 0.682 0.676 0.674
(e, b, c, d, a) 0.755 0.740 0.730 0.722 0.713 0.705 0.699 0.693 0.687 0.684
(e, b, d, a, c) 0.744 0.728 0.719 0.711 0.703 0.697 0.691 0.686 0.679 0.677
(e, b, d, c, a) 0.758 0.741 0.730 0.720 0.711 0.703 0.696 0.692 0.685 0.682
(e, c, a, b, d) 0.755 0.742 0.731 0.723 0.714 0.707 0.700 0.697 0.691 0.687
(e, c, a, d, b) 0.769 0.754 0.743 0.735 0.725 0.715 0.707 0.703 0.696 0.693
(e, c, b, a, d) 0.737 0.727 0.718 0.712 0.704 0.697 0.692 0.689 0.683 0.680
(e, c, b, d, a) 0.765 0.751 0.742 0.734 0.724 0.715 0.707 0.703 0.696 0.693
(e, c, d, a, b) 0.765 0.750 0.738 0.729 0.719 0.711 0.704 0.699 0.692 0.688
(e, c, d, b, a) 0.764 0.748 0.737 0.728 0.718 0.709 0.701 0.696 0.689 0.685
(e, d, a, b, c) 0.750 0.744 0.736 0.730 0.723 0.716 0.711 0.707 0.701 0.698
(e, d, a, c, b) 0.761 0.752 0.743 0.736 0.728 0.718 0.713 0.708 0.702 0.698
(e, d, b, a, c) 0.740 0.737 0.729 0.723 0.716 0.710 0.705 0.701 0.695 0.692
(e, d, b, c, a) 0.764 0.754 0.745 0.737 0.728 0.719 0.713 0.708 0.701 0.697
(e, d, c, a, b) 0.748 0.740 0.732 0.725 0.718 0.712 0.705 0.702 0.696 0.692
(e, d, c, b, a) 0.752 0.743 0.733 0.726 0.718 0.710 0.703 0.699 0.693 0.688
Table 4.10: The average reliability Q̂ between 12 ≤ D ≤ 30
for a jury of size 5
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Chapter 5
Summary and Future Works
In conclusion, this thesis is a collection of three essays on search and pursuit games and
jury voting problems. In both these areas I incorporated the analysis of sequential learn-
ing. In Chapter 2 Section 2.8, we answer a natural question whether it is possible that
after repeated search and escape, the capture probability in the locations could in theory
be learnt by the searcher and the hider. Our contribution using stochastic games provide
a simplistic understanding that having to learn the capture probability is favourable to
the prey. Moreover, when these probabilities are high, variability (heterogeneity) of the
locations in terms of their capture probabilities favour the predator. This is the first
analysis into understanding the effect of learning in search games. The same discussion
using the deterministic game form in Chapter 3 Section 3.4 gives support to the findings
established by the stochastic version. In Chapter 4, our study investigates the optimal
voting ordering of a heterogeneous jury in an open sequential vote for binary alterna-
tives. Different from previous work in this area, the ordering of votes between jurors with
different ability plays an important role in determining the reliability of the verdict. The
reliability is the probability that the majority vote agrees with the true state of Nature.
Given the signal and ability of the first juror, the subsequent jurors receive information
about the votes. This information includes the abilities of the previous voters, and the
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a priori probability of the binary alternatives. Through Bayes law, subsequent jurors
update the a priori probability and votes honestly according to his signals. This is a
learning process through information aggregation between the jurors. Our results in this
study show that the Alpern Chen ordering (median ability first, highest ability second,
and lowest ability last) produces the highest average reliability and optimality fraction
in comparison with the other voting orderings.
The collection of results in the three papers presented in this thesis, although
mostly theoretical, provides clear contributions to the central objectives in Operations
Research. The research objective of the three papers is to determine the optimal pol-
icy for practical problems given the circumstances. In understanding the behaviour of
animals during hunting season, Theorem 6 under Chapter 2 for instance provides impli-
cations for the question of when to keep hiding or to leave the lair and by what route.
Our modified model in Chapter 3 improves upon the work of [36] where the time to
search each location can now be a non-constant parameter. Our study on the optimal
voting orderings for heterogeneous jury in a sequential majority voting is within the
area of optimization. Much of our findings presented in this work (Chapter 4) serve as
heuristic yet robust suggestions for the leadership team within an organization to best
convenes a group of experts into reaching the final decision through a majority vote.
Finally, several potential avenues for extension can be envisaged to our proposed
models and solutions. The study of search and pursuit games as well as optimal ordering
under sequential voting are both relatively new within their respective area of study.
Thus, there are huge potential for interdisciplinary joint research to add upon our works.
Listed below are the potential future studies for the three essays in this thesis.
• One may argue that in a real-life scenario, the game played between a predator
and a prey may not necessarily have to be a zero-sum game as analyzed in Chap-
ter 2. The predator is chasing after it’s “dinner” and the prey is running for it’s
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life. We have noted in Section 2.9 that non-zero sum stochastic games have been
developed only a few years after zero-sum games were introduced. The games have
been proven to be difficult to solve and it’s complexity had been increasing rapidly
since. Hence, for search and pursuit games, implementing non-zero sum games
represent a new and much needed field. In addition, one of the referees reviewing
our work for the Journal of Royal Society Interface commented on the feasibility
of using Evolutionary Game Theory in further advancing the work in this area.
Indeed, our current games are not suitable for Evolutionary Game analysis or Evo-
lutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Search Games do not have pure strategy saddle
points. Thus, the emphasis of our model is that animals can learn these games
socially rather than evolutionarily, as shown in [52]. We certainly believe that the
evolutionary aspect might be of interest to game theorist and biologist for future
translational joint research.
• The three sub-problems we introduced in Chapter 3 can benefit from different ap-
proach to solving the deterministic game. One example can be the use of fictituous
play as demonstrated in [48] through their Best Response Oracle algorithm. In
a more general sense, fictitious play is useful to find the game’s value in iterative
methods, which are easier to compute than analytical methods when the problem
gets more complicated. Implementing this algorithm into learning enables us to
find the solution to any two players zero-sum games, including the normal form
games of search and pursuit.
• We also made strict assumptions for our learning model which could potentially be
extended in future studies. First, it is interesting to see if the distribution of the
conditional capture probability could be made arbitrary instead of equiprobable.
This is difficult to envision in the normal form model. However, in the dynamic
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version of the learning game, when there are only two locations, this simply means
that g(0) will have an initial value of θ, and since the effective capture probability
p̂(0) is dependent on g(0), this will no longer be (a+ b)/2 (randomize between the
two locations at time 0) and instead, the searcher will initially search according to
the effective capture probability of p̂(0) = θa+(1−θ)b. Another possible extension
is to make the search time for each location to be exogenous with respect to the
hider’s strategy. For instance the hider could add layers of obstacles in a location
with lower capture probability to make it harder for the searcher to traverse and
thus, artificially increasing the search time. This location will then be more at-
tractive for the searcher to allocate his effort. The hider can even hide in other
locations, leaving her “artificial” hiding location as a decoy to trick the searcher
to waste his search time. This analysis of “smart” hider using a decoy in a hiding
location has been analysed in a different model between a scatter hoarder and a
pilferer [6].
• Our propositions on optimal voting ordering in Chapter 4 can benefit from ex-
perimental studies. Our results are based on computations from a finite number
of cases using Wolfram’s Mathematica and MatLab. It would be interesting to
test our model with the behaviour research lab in which the jury ordering will be
randomized, and the ability of each juror will be determined prior using computer
interface test. The purpose of this study is to fill the gap in understanding group’s
voting behaviour through artificial decision-making scenario, which will be of in-
terest to social scientist or behavioural researcher.
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[54] Meyhöfer, R., Casas, J., & Dorn, S. (1997). Vibration–mediated interactions in
a host–parasitoid system. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological
Sciences, 264(1379), 261–266.
[55] Morice S., Pincebourde S., Darboux F., Kaiser W., & Casas J. (2013). Predator–
prey pursuit–evasion games in structurally complex environments. Integr. Comp.
Biol. 53(5), 767–779.
[56] Morse, P.M., Kimball, G.E. ,& Gass, S.I.(2003). Methods of operations research.
Courier Corporation.
[57] Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. (2001). Information aggregation in debate: who
should speak first? Journal of Public Economics, 81(3), 393–421.
[58] Owen, G., Grofman, B., & Feld, S.L. (1989). Proving a distribution-free generaliza-
tion of the Condorcet jury theorem. Mathematical Social Sciences, 17(1), 1–16.
[59] Pincebourde, S., & Casas, J. (2015). Warming tolerance across insect ontogeny:
influence of joint shifts in microclimates and thermal limits. Ecology, 96(4), 986–997.
120
[60] Pitchford, J. (2013). Applications of search in biology: some open problems. In
Search Theory: A Game Theoretic Perspective, 295-303. Springer, New York, USA.
[61] Puterman, M. L. (2005). Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic
Programming. Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics.
[62] Ross, S. M. (1983). Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming. Academic
press.
[63] Rudebeck, G. (1951). The choice of prey and modes of hunting of predatory birds
with special reference to their selective effect. Oikos, 3(2), 200–231.
[64] Selten, R. (1988). A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal
conflicts. In Models of Strategic Rationality, 67–75. Springer. Dordrecht, The Nether-
lands.
[65] Shapley L.S. (1953) Stochastic games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 39(10), 1095–1100.
[66] Sillar, K. T., Picton, L. D., & Heitler, W. J. (2016). The Neuroethology of Predation
and Escape. John Wiley & Sons.
[67] Solan, E., & Vieille, N. (2015). Stochastic Games: A Perspective. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the USA. 112(10), 13743–13746.
[68] Stephens, D. W., Brown, J. S., & Ydenberg, R. C. (Eds.). (2007). Foraging: Be-
havior and Ecology. University of Chicago Press.
[69] Stephens, D. W., & Krebs, J. R. (1986). Foraging Theory. Princeton University
Press.
[70] Stirling, I. (1974). Midsummer observations on the behavior of wild polar bears
(Ursus maritimus). Canadian Journal of Zoology, 52(9), 1191-1198.
121
[71] Weibull, J. (2017). Evolutionary game theory. Lecture Notes. Delhi Winter
School, December 2017. (http://econdse.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/lecture-
dws1a.pdf)
[72] Wilson A., Lowe J., Roskilly K., Hudson P., Golabek K., & McNutt J. (2013).
Locomotion dynamics of hunting in wild cheetahs. Nature, 498(7453), 185–189.
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